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I. INTRODUCTION 
133 
Most jurisdictions within the United States currently util-
ize the post-mortem model of probate. Under this theory, an 
individual of legal age and of sufficient mental health plans for 
the distribution of his bounty at death, apportioning shares to 
individuals or organizations that he feels are most deserving. 
These generous intentions are then formalized by being 
scribed into his last will and testament, which is stored in a 
safe and often secret place. The will awaits the death of its 
writer so that at the time of probate, it can be read once again 
to proclaim donative intent and assure that the estate is dis-
tributed in accordance with the testator's desires. While this 
theory of probate sounds quite proper, experience has revealed 
that in many cases it serves only to destroy the very intentions 
which it is designed to protect. Post-mortem probate provides 
a feeding ground for spurious will contests which eat away the 
corpus of an estate no longer protected by the evidentiary 
power that lies buried with the testator. 
An alternative to post-mortem probate is to validate the 
testator's will during the testator's lifetime. This is known as 
ante-mortem or living probate. Although some believe ante-
mortem probate is a controversial solution to the difficulties 
encountered with post-mortem probate, ante-mortem probate 
has roots reaching as far back as the biblical era. In addition, 
it was first implemented in the United States, albeit unsuccess-
fully, in the late. nineteenth century. This article will discuss 
the problems with post-mortem probate and will demonstrate 
that conventional techniques fail to adequately resolve these 
difficulties. The evolution of ante-mortem probate which lead 
to the three modern models of ante-mortem probate will be 
described. Attention will then turn to the three states which 
have ante-mortem statutes and the unsuccessful effort of the 
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State 
Laws to approve a uniform act. Finally, the authors will urge 
that ante-mortem probate be given serious consideration be-
cause it has significant benefits while its potential problems 
can be surmounted or counterbalanced. 
From the outset, readers should be aware that the pur-
pose of this article is neither to suggest that the post-mortem 
model of probate be abolished nor that ante-mortem probate 
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is a panacea. Rather, it is to demonstrate that ante-mortem 
probate is a viable technique which could serve to reduce the 
problematic side of the current post-mortem system and pro-
vide a wide range of benefits to a significant segment of the 
public. 
II. INADEQUACY OF POST-MORTEM PROBATE 
A. Difficulties with Post-Mortem Probate 
There are three basic areas which demonstrate the flaws 
in any post-mortem probate system: the encouragement of 
spurious will contests, the frustration of the testator's intent, 
and the creation of significant evidentiary problems. 
Although these areas are discussed separately, they cannot be 
truly compartmentalized. In addition, other difficulties are 
subsumed in these three categories, such as the tremendous 
wasting of court time and estate resources which occurs when-
ever probate matters are disputed on artificial grounds. 
1. Encouraging Spurious Will Contests 
[T]he post mortem squabblings and contests on mental con-
dition ... have made a will the least secure of all human 
dealings, and made it doubtful whether in some regions in-
sanity is not accepted as the normal condition of testators. 1 
One of the major purposes of a post-mortem will contest 
is to ensure that deserving heirs do not lose their portion of a 
decedent's estate as a result of fraud, improper influence, or 
insufficient capacity which may have affected the decedent at 
the time he executed his will. 2 Synthesized by the greedy plots 
of disgruntled devisees and disinherited heirs, however, the 
will contest has taken on several new dimensions. These in-
clude attempts to prove lack of mental capacity, fraud, or im-
proper influence where none existed for the sole purpose of 
1. Lloyd v. Wayne Circuit Judge, 56 Mich. 236, 242, 23 N.W. 28, 30 (1885). 
2. Wilson v. Kemp, 7 Ark. App. 44, 51,644 S.W.2d 306, 310 (1982) (the probate 
court has duty to preserve interest of those who are or who may become beneficiaries of 
decedent's estate); Will ofWharton, 114 Misc. 2d 1017, -, 453 N.Y.S.2d 308, 311 ' 
(1982) (the purpose of probate is to distribute assets according to testator's intentions 
only if testator is free from restraint, has testamentary capacity, and is otherwise compe-
tent). Cj Palazzi v. Estate of Gardner, 32 Ohio St. 3d 169, -, 512 N.E.2d 971, 974 
(1987) (the ability to contest will constitutes constitutionally protected interest). 
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taking a greater share of the bounty. These apocryphal chal-
lenges to the integrity of the testator place tremendous finan-
cial strain on the corpus of the estate and, to prevent total 
depletion, are often settled out of court. Because of the extra-
tribunal nature of these settlements, their consuming effect is 
seldom recorded, making the extent of their thievery difficult 
to determine; however, everyday knowledge and experience 
suggests that this practice is widespread. 3 
Under the majority of post-mortem procedures, the 
plaintiff, after losing a spurious will contest, is not required to 
reimburse the decedent's estate for attorney's fees and court 
costs expended while defending the unjustified claim.4 This 
practice encourages a potential heir to attempt to "strike it 
rich" because even if the attack is unsuccessful, the penalty 
suffered will be little more than disappointment. 5 
While monetary gain is generally the motivating factor 
behind spurious will contests, another common factor, even 
more morally abhorrent, is the desire of a disinherited relative 
to embarrass and tarnish the actions of the testator and his 
family with the proverbial skeletons which are pulled from the 
family closet during capacity litigation. 6 The adoption of 
some type of ante-mortem probate could work in conjunction 
with current post-mortem procedures to effectively carry out 
3. See, e.g., Letter to the Missouri Bar Association (June 29, 1933), reprinted in 4 
Mo. B.J. I 10 (1933); N.Y. Times, Mar. 24, 1931, at 54, col. 4; N.Y. Times, June 30, 
1933, at 19, col. 6. 
4. See, e.g .. Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. I, 4 n.4 (1973); Succession of Montegut, 508 
So. 2d 892, 896 (La. App. 1987) (no valid claim for damages for frivolous challenge 
unless filed solely for delay or without sincere belief of meritorious challenge); In re 
Estate of Nelson, 281 N.W.2d 245, 250 (N.D. 1979) (costs and attorneys fee's recover-
able from will contestants where challenge was made without reasonable cause, not in 
good faith and found to be untrue); see also In re Estate of Kern, 239 Kan. 8, 716 P.2d 
528, 538 (1986) (beneficiaries not entitled to recover attorney's fees where contest is not 
frivolous). Cf N.Y. SuRR. CT. PROC. AcT LAW§ 2302(3)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1989) 
(an unsuccessful claimant may be required to pay costs); TENN. CODE ANN.§ 32-4-101 
(1984) (contestant is required to post bond to secure payment of costs if unsuccessful); 
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 879.33 (West Supp. 1988) (losing party may be required to pay 
costs). 
5. See Comment, The Ante Mortem Alternative to Probate Legislation in Ohio, 9 
CAP. U.L. REV. 717, 719 (1980) (a will challenger possesses evidentiary advantages 
because the burden of proving a will's validity lies in its proponent). 
6. Id. at 719 n.19 (an argument could be made that such motivation is void as 
against public policy). 
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the intent of the decedent, while protecting against over-
crowding the courts with unfounded litigation. 
2. Frustrating the Testator's Intent 
The primary function of testament.ary law is to maintain 
efficient procedures for the transfer of the testator's property 
at the time of his death in accordance with his intentions. 7 A 
will is designed to disrupt the usual flow of property estab-
lished by law from the testator to his next of kin. 8 Because a 
will often transfers property to a specific person, it may be 
considered a type of conveyance allowing the decedent to en-
joy final control of the disposition of his estate. 9 The ability to 
convey one's property is a right which every property owner 
normally enjoys during his life and, by use of a will, expects to 
have upon his death. Therefore, a person anticipates having 
sole control-both before and after death-over the disposi-
tion of his property. 10 Few would argue with the premise that 
any legal technique that tends to thwart this basic right of 
ownership is in some way defective. · 
Post-mortem probate allows a will to be invalldated by 
reason of a pure technical error such as defective signatures or 
attestation. 11 Probate is necessary to test a will's validity and 
to prove its authenticity. 12 However, testing the validity of 
the instrument after the testator's death is the most illogical 
and impractical time for such scrutiny because even the sim-
plest of errors have the unavoidable effect of destroying the 
validity of a will and upsetting the testator's intentions. 13 
7. See Cavers, Ante Mortem Probate: An Essay In Preventive Law, I U. CHI. L. 
REV. 440, 440 (1934). 
8. See Redfearn, Ante-Mortem Probate, 38 COM. L.J. 571, 571 (1933) (property 
transferred by will is analogous to conveyance but the instrument must first be proved 
to be valid before the transfer is effective). 
9. Jd. 
10. See Banks v. Goodfellow, 5 Q.B. 549, 564 (1870) ("power of disposing of prop-
erty in anticipation of death has ever [sic] been regarded as one of the most valuable of 
the rights incidental to property"); Cavers, supra note 7, at 445 (essence of will contin-
ues power of conveyance). 
II. See Redfearn, supra note 8, at 572 (the most common causes for will contests 
are attestation errors, forgery, undue influence, lack of testamentary capacity, and exist-
ence or conduct of potential heir). See infra note 13. 
12. /d. at 571. 
13. Jd.; see also Orrell v. Cochran, 695 S.W.2d 552, 552 (Tex. 1985) (the signature 
of a testator on self-proving affidavit rather than on the will invalidated the will); Boren 
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No matter how sane, competent, and lucid a testator may 
be or how strong his desire that his estate be administered by 
trusted persons, our current system of post~mortem probate 
cannot guarantee a testator that his intentions and instruc-
tions will be carried out in spite of all the expense and caution 
exerted. 14 The post-mortem probate system does not offer a 
true and effective method to probate a will nor does it test the 
validity of the intentions expressed within it because the best 
evidence, the testimony of the testator, is unavailable. 15 Post-
mortem probate creates a situation in which excluded heirs 
are invited to challenge the will and use tlie testator's ex-
pressed intentions to destroy the instrument, question the 
giver's sanity, and line their own pockets with property that 
was never intended to be theirs. 16 Post-mortem probate law is 
encumbered with antiquated presumptions, procedures, and 
traditions, which by resisting statutory alt.eration, are sure to 
frustrate testamentary intent and reveal with shining clarity 
the need for an alternative. 17 
Under the post-mortem system, judges and jurors ·often 
evaluate the testator's scheme by their own standards of what 
a fair and normal distribution should be. 18 This procedure has 
v. Boren, 402 S.W.2d 728, 729-30 (Tex. 1966) (signatures of witnesses on self-proving 
affidavit rather than on will invalidated will). But cf Langbein, Substantial Compliance 
With the Wills Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 489, 489 (1975) ("insistent formalism of the law 
of wills is mistaken and needless"). 
14. See Redfearn, supra note 8, at 571 (voidness of will due to simple mistake is an 
unreasonable solution); Comment, supra note 5, at 717-18 (testator's fear that testamen-
tary disposition of property will not be by his expressed intent calls into question the 
ability of probate law to fulfill its purpose and function). 
15. See Redfearn, supra note 8, at 571. 
16. See Fink, Ante-Mortem Probate Revisited: Can An Idea Have a Life After 
Death?, 37 OHIO ST. L.J. 264, 265-66 n.l (1976) (provides examples of will contests 
brought by unscrupulous heirs). 
17. See Langbein, supra note 13, at 489 (any formal defect found in a will causes it 
to fail despite· voluminous evidence that defect was inconsequential); Comment, Con-
temporary Ante-Mortem Statutory Formulations: Observations and Alternatives, 32 
CASE W. REs. 823, 825 (1982) (ante-mortem probate provides solutions to post-mortem 
quandaries such as testator's intent and capacity as well as attorney malpractice). 
18. See Fellows, The Case Against Living Probate, 78 MICH. L. REV. 1066, 1070 
(1980); North Carolina Nat') Bank v. Goode, 298 N.C. 485, -, 259 S.E.2d 288, 292 
(1979) (the court presumed distributive scheme which lessened federal taxes); In re Es-
tate of Khadad, 135 Misc. 2d 67, -, 514 N.Y.S.2d 625, 627-28 (1987) (the court con-
strued will as benefitting surviving spouse by allowing maximum marital deduction). 
But see Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Schwartz, 120 Ill. App. 3d 324, -, 458 N.E.2d 
HeinOnline -- 43 Ark. L. Rev. 138 1990
138 ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:131 
the effect of subjecting testamentary transfers to meticulous 
examination when the same transaction, if done inter vivos, 
would hardly have been questioned. 19 ·The paradox existing 
between inter vivos and testamentary transfers strongly sug-
gests that post-mortem probate fails to protect not only the 
testator's intent, but also the basic rights and principles associ-
ated with the ownership of property.20 This paradox between 
inter vivos and testamentary transfers can be easily illustrated 
with stories in which wealthy testators intend that their 
bounty be devised to deserving charitable organizations only 
to become the subject of ridicule and accusation at the hands 
of their heirs and devisees. 21 
Under the ante-mortem alternative the deceased testator 
could receive the same level of respect given him while alive. 
Furthermore, the testator could ensure that the intent ex-
pressed in his will would be as secure as that of any competent 
person recorded in an error-free medium. 
3. Creating Significant Evidentiary Problems 
One of the recurring problems with post-mortem probate 
is that the trier of fact must determine the condition of the 
testator's mind and the validity of the will by making infer-
ences from evidence of past conduct and circumstances sur-
rounding the testator. The evidentiary problems are both 
complex and numerous because the testator is dead and can-
not testify as to his true intent. Only indirect evidence is 
available to test his capacity which, whether he was a mad-
151, 154 (1983) (a court may not alter scheme of distribution even if it is illogical or 
peculiar where it is not contrary to clear intent of testator). 
19. Comment, supra note 5, at 718 (failure of testamentary law to fulfill testators' 
desires causes testators to deplete their estates). 
20. See Taft, Comments on Will Contests in New York, 30 YALE L.J. 593, 606 
(1921) (wills are scrutinized even though the person's capacity to make deed or contract 
would not be questioned if he or she were alive thus interfering with owner's right to 
transfer property to desired person). 
21. See Fink, supra note 16, at 265-66 n.I (provides examples of will contests by 
desperate heirs); see also Baliles v. Miller, 231 Va. 48, -, 340 S.E.2d 805, 810 (1986) 
(heirs argue against applying cy pres doctrine or implied trust to vague charitable be-
quest); In re Will of McCarthy, 49 A.D.2d 204, -, 374 N.Y.S.2d 203, 208-09 (1975) 
(the court prevented lapse of gift to convent no longer in existence); Succession of Stur-
gis, 516 So. 2d 1293, 1298 (La. App. 1987) (questionable claim of perpetual drunken-
ness of testator as challenge to will containing charitable bequest). 
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man or simply eccentric with his property, tends to be a mat-
ter of mere speculation. In addition, the quality of any 
evidence, particularly recollection, deteriorates with time. 22 
These evidentiary problems encourage and provide an 
advantage to spurious will contests. For example, in Hickman 
v. Hickman/3 a Texas court stated that a will which failed to 
provide for the testator's wife and child supported the jury 
finding of insufficient mental capacity despite numerous wit-
nesses' testimony that the testator was of sound mind at the 
time the will was executed. 24 · 
Some attention must be given to the evidentiary advan-
tages that the contestants to a post:-mortem procedure enjoy 
which encourage spurious challenges to a will's validity.25 
Any litigation is a financial burden on the estate and on the 
rightful beneficiaries, particularly if the estate pays the cost of 
litigation for unsuccessful challenges. 26 This financial burden 
has a tendency to force settlements of unfounded challenges. 27 
Furthermore, the burden is on the proponent of the will to 
prove capacity. 28 However, the star witness, the testator, is 
22. See McCrystal & Maschari, Will Electronic Technology Take the Witness 
Stand?, II U. ToL. L. REV. 239, 249-52 (1980) (potential inaccuracies of human mem-
ory create inconsistencies, bias, prejudice, and inaccuracy which slow the administra-
tion of justice). 
23. 244 S.W.2d 681 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951). 
24. Id. at 683-84. 
25. See Comment, supra note 5, at 718-19 (post-mortem probate poses evidentiary 
problems of placing the testator's testimony beyond the court's reach and deterioration 
of witnesses' recollection of events surrounding execution of will). 
26. See Cahn, Undue Influence and Captation-A Comparative Study, 8 TuL. L. 
REV. 507, 517 (1934) (fees and expenses of contested probate proceedings are tacked to 
testator's estate while rarely imposed on unsuccessful contestants); Comment, supra 
note 5, at 719 (despite spurious nature of contestant's claim to will's validity, monetary 
burden of litigation traditionally falls upon estate leaving the unsuccessful challenger 
only disappointed). 
27. See Cavers, supra note 7, at 443 n.IO (although elderly New York recluse left 
no relatives, 2,360 people attempted to establish themselves as heirs with some individu-
als related in the fifth degree settling for $2,000,000 not to contest will). 
28. See, e.g., Cushman v. Nichols, 20 Mass. App. 980, -, 482 N.E.2d 862, 864 
(1985) (the proponent has ultimate burden of proving testamentary capacity); Estate of 
Jenks, 291 Minn. 138, -, 189 N.W.2d 695, 698 (1971) (the burden of proving mental 
capacity rests with proponent of will); Estate of Kumstar, 66 N.Y.2d 691, -, 496 
N.Y.S. 414, -, 487 N.E.2d 271, 272 (1985) (the proponent of will has burden of prov-
ing testamentary capacity); Croucher v. Croucher, 660 S.W.2d 55, 57 (Tex. 1983) (the 
burden of proving capacity is on proponent). But see, e.g., Sessions v. Handley, 470 So. 
2d 1164, 1167 (Ala. 1985) (the contestant has burden of proving lack of testamentary 
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unable to present his prpof personally.29 Similarly, because of 
the length of time that normally elapses between the execution 
of a will and its subsequent challenge, witnesses necessary to 
prove the testator's capacity may no longer be available.30 
The ante-mortem probate alternative would significantly re-
duce the evidentiary problems found in post-mortem systems. 
A living probate system allows a court to evaluate testa-
mentary capacity while the testator is still alive to present his 
evidence.31 An ante-mortem approach would prevent the 
court and jury from being swayed by their own perceptio.ns of 
the inequitable treatment of the disinherited kin. 32 Other ad-
vantages which stem from using ante-mortem techniques in-
clude: 1) evidence could be presented in a non-adversarial 
context under some models;33 2) the testator would be avail-
able to the court to eliminate ambiguous silence; 3) the cir-
cumstances of disinheritance could be explored beyond the 
realm of mere conjecture;34 and 4) the heirs apparent must 
choose to contest the will earlier than is in their interest to do . 
capacity based on presumption of capacity to make a will); Succession of Lyons, 452 So. 
2d 1161, 1164 (La. 1984) (the burden of proving lack of capacity is on party so alleging); 
Estate of Kesler, 702 P.2d 86, 88 (Utah 1985) (contestant has burden of proving testa-
mentary incapacity). 
29. See Comment, supra note 5, at 717-19 (post-mortem probate poses problems of 
its inability to guarantee testator's desires, deteriorating evidence, and spurious chal-
lenges, all of which could be remedied by allowing testator to testify in ante-mortem 
proceeding). 
30. /d. at 718-19. 
31. /d. 
32. See Redfearn, supra note 8, at 572 (disinherited heirs would be cautious to 
challenge testator's devise if they knew testator would rebut their challenge face-to-
face); see also Armstrong v. Butler, 262 Ark. 31, 41, 553 S.W.2d 453,458 (1977) (pre-
sumption against disinheriting lineal descendants); Trust Co. Bank v. First Nat') Bank, 
246 Ga. 222, -, 271 S.E.2d 141, 143 (1980) (~here unclear, presumption that testator 
intended to pass property within bloodline); Estate of McAfee, 463 Pa. 250, ..:_, 344 . 
A.2d 817,819 (1975) (will interpreted to conform most nearly with intestate laws where 
ambiguity exists); Porter v. Porter, 286 N.W.2d 649, 655-56 (Iowa 1979) (will construed 
in favor of following laws of descent and distribution unless clear indication of 
disinheritance). 
33. See Redfearn, supra note 8, at 572 (the purpose of ante-mortem probate is to 
establish will's validity during testator's lifetime rendering negatory challenges to will's 
validity which are meant to disavow and destroy testator's intent). 
34. See Langbein, Living Probate: The Conservatorship Model, 77 MICH. L. REV. 
63, 67-68 (1978) (testator would be expressly cautioned about seriousness and irregular-
ity of projected disinheritance and asked to explain his reasons at or before the execu-
tion ceremony to preserve superior evidence of capacity). 
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so, thus, alleviating any speculation as to their designs. In 
sum, ante-mortem probate offers evidentiary advantages une-
qualled by its post-mortem counterpart. 
B. Failure of Conventional Techniques to Adequately 
Resolve Post-Mortem Difficulties 
There are four conventional techniques which have at-
tempted to resolve the problems with post-mortem probate: 
non-probate transfers, self-proved wills, in terrorem clauses, 
and videotaped will execution ceremonies. However, none of 
these techniques are a substitute for ante-mortem probate. 
1. Non-Probate Transfers 
Many testators frightened by the prospect of leaving their 
families and estates subject to the roulette wheel of post-
mortem probate use other means to divest their fortunes in 
order to avoid probate altogether. At least one commentator 
has recommended that such techniques should be chosen over 
the use of ante-mortem solutions. 35 However, these tech-
niques offer only slightly more security than the probate they 
claim to avoid. There are three commonly used methods of 
non-probate transfers: revocable inter vivos trusts, joint own-
ership with survivorship rights, and outright gifts. 36 When 
non-probate transfers are used, the common factor creating 
instability is that people are motivated by fears that testamen-
tary instructions will not be carried out. The·result is that the 
post-mortem probate 'system is compromised. · 
a. Revocable Inter Vivos Trusts 
Revocable inter vivos trusts have become a popular way 
of avoiding probate. 37 When a trust of this type is used, the 
35. Fellows, supra note 18, at 1067. 
36. These three methods, of course, do not provipe an exclusive Jist of the options 
available. 
37. See Sullivan v. Burkin, 390 Mass. 864, -, 460 N.E.2d 572, 575 (1984) (revoca-
ble trust is not invalid as testamentary disposition); Westerfeld v. Huckaby, 474 S.W.2d 
189, 193 (Tex. 1971) (trust is not invalid because its purpose is to avoid probate); Davis 
v. KB & T Co., 309 S.E.2d 45, 49 (W.Va. 1983) (ability to revoke trust does not render 
trust testamentary); see also Lundergan, Elderly Clients Require Special Lifetime Plan-
ning, TR. & EsT., Feb. 1986, at 33-34 (self-declared trust is popular as probate avoid-
ance device). 
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settlor transfers property into the corpus of a trust and names 
those persons as beneficiaries who would have received prop-
erty under his will. 38 When the settlor dies, the power to re-
voke the trust is extinguished. 39 The trust continues to 
operate in favor of the beneficiaries without the intervention of 
probate.40 Although this technique is effective, there are both 
positive and negative attributes which should be weighed in 
considering it as an alternative to either post-mortem or ante-
mortem probate. First, the trust offers protection by placing 
property within the bounds of equity law where there is less 
chance of a sympathetic jury upsetting the settlor's inten-
tions.41 Second, the establishment of a trust reflects greater 
deliberations on behalf of the would-be testator as to how he 
wishes his property distributed. 42 Third, a trust generally pro-
vides intermediaries, such as a bank or trust officer, that can 
be used to show the settlor's capacity by their reliance on his 
demands.43 
Revocable trusts have a dark side as well. Depending on 
how they are worded, these trusts can be construed as valid 
inter vivos conveyances,44 which may prompt judicial inquir-
38. The problem of perpetuities usually will not occur. For an excellent composi-
tion regarding this issue see T. BERGIN & P. HASKELL, PREFACE TO ESTATES IN LAND 
AND FUTURE INTERESTS 208 (1984). 
39. See Citizens Nat'l Bank v. Allen, 575 S.W.2d 654, 658 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978) 
(a revocable trust becomes irrevocable on trustor's death). But see Euart v. Yoakley, 
456 So. 2d 1327, 1329 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (an inter vivos trust may be revoked by 
written will); Cisneros v. San Miguel, 640 S.W.2d 327, 330 (Tex. App. 1982) (a trust 
conveys defeasible interest to beneficiary which can be defeated by revocation of trust, 
disposition of trust res by will or nonexistence of res at death). 
40. See Roberts v. Roberts, 286 F.2d 647, 652 (9th Cir. 1961) (property held under 
valid inter vivos revocable trust became absolute property of beneficiary on death of 
settlor); Favata v. Favata, 74 Ill. App. 3d 979, 982, 394 N.E.2d 443, 446 (1979) (interest 
passes on creation of trust to beneficiary, not at death of settlor); In re Walz, 423 
N.E.2d 729,733 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981) (the transfer of property through inter vivos trust 
vests interest at time of creation of trust thereby avoiding effect of probate); Citizens 
Nat') Bank v. Allen, 575 S.W.2d 654, 658 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978) (a beneficiary may 
enforce a revocable inter vivos trust on death of settlor). 
41. See Langbein, supra note 34, at 67 ("(t)rusts belong to the jury-free realm of 
equity law"). 
42. See id. (an active settlor who conveys property to a corpus and who receives 
income from a trust shows intentional conduct as compared to testator who merely 
signs will). 
43. /d. 
44. Being outside the Wills Act, judges are faced with the task of defining the 
intentions of the testator. 
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ies to determine, nunc pro tunc, the legal intentions of the set-
tlor.45 Heirs may also challenge the validity of a revocable 
trust by raising arguments similar to those employed in a will 
contest, such as claims that fraud or undue influence was ex-
erted on the settlor or that the settlor lacked capacity:46 
Therefore, although a revocable trust might decrease family 
conflicts and provide greater control by the settlor over his 
property, it still may not be the most appealing solution. 
b. Joint Ownership with Survivorship Rights 
Another common probate avoidance technique is joint 
ownership of property with rights of survivorship.47 This es-
tate planning tool, commonly used between spouses, permits 
the property subject to the survivorship agreement to passim-
mediately to the surviving joint owner without the interfer-
ence of a probate court.48 In many situations, this device will 
effectuate the intent of the parties. However, it is not accurate 
45. See Payne v. River Forest State Bank & Trust Co., 81 Ill. App. 3d 428, -, 401 
N.E.2d 1229, 1233 (1980) (the retention of a life estate is relevant on the issue of 
whether present donative intent exists); Cruse v. Leary, 727 S.W.2d 408, 410 (Ky. Ct. 
App. 1987) (trust not deemed testamentary even though benefits are not distributed 
until death of settlor). 
46. See Dopp v. Sugarloaf Mining Co., 288 Ark. 18, 18, 702 S.W.2d 393, 393 
(1986) (trust overturned based on. fraud or forgery); Olson v. Harshman, 233 Kan. 
1055,-, 668 P.2d 147, 149 (1983) (daughter sued to set aside trusts that were executed 
by her parents on the grounds of undue influence by a brother); Coleman v. First Nat'! 
Bank, 81 Nev. 51,-, 506 P.2d 86, 87 (1973) (daughter challenged trust on the basis of 
incompetency at the time of execution); see also Nickerson v. Fiduciary Trust Co., 6 
Mass. App. Ct. 317, -, 375 N.E.2d 357, 358 (1978) (settlor sues to reform or invalidate 
trust on grounds of undue influence); Brinker v. Wobaco Trust Ltd., 610 S.W.2d 160, 
163 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980) (equity allows reformation of trust where, by mistake, it fails 
to express the true intent of settlor); see generally Fellows, supra note 18, at 1094. 
47. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 658.56 (West 1984) (deposits and accounts in two 
or more names); N.Y. BANKING L. § 675 (McKinney 1971 & Supp. 1989) Qoint depos-
its and shares; ownership and payment); OHIO REV. CoDE ANN. § 1107.08 (Baldwin 
1988) (deposits in name of two or more persons payable on death); TEx. PROB. CoDE 
ANN. § 439(a) (Vernon Supp. 1990) (right of survivorship in bank accounts). 
48. · See Chopin v. Interfirst Bank Dallas N.A., 694 S.W.2d 79, 83-84 (Tex. Ct. 
App. 1985) (nontestamentary transfers are governed by probate code for sums remain-
ing on deposit at death of co-depositor); Sheffield v. Dozier, 643 S.W.2d 197, 198 (Tex. 
Ct. App. 1982) (sums in joint account with right of survivorship are owned by survivor 
and do not pass to estate); TEX. PROB. CODE ANN.§ 451 (Vernon Supp. 1990) (At any 
time, spouses may agree that all or part of their community pr9perty, then existing or to 
be acquired, becomes the property of the surviving spouse on the death of"the other 
spouse). 
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to say that joint ownership with survivorship rights is an effec-
tive option to ante-mortem probate. 
With joint ownership, each owner has the ability to con-
trol his or her proportionate share of the asset. 49 Many indi-
viduals prefer to retain total control of the property until 
death and are unwilling to divest themselves of those rights 
prematurely. 50 Even if the original owner agreed to relinquish 
his or her rights, the entire transaction, including both its gift 
and survivorship aspects, could be questioned by dissatisfied 
heirs or will beneficiaries on various grounds such as lack of 
capacity and undue influence. 51 
c. Outright Gifts 
The simplest and most pedestrian non-probate transfer is 
the outright gift. 52 Although gifts are effective in avoiding 
49. See Gillota v. Gillota, 4 Ohio St. 3d 222, -, 448 N.E.2d 802, 804 (1983) (a 
joint account with right of survivorship belongs to all parties during their lifetimes in 
proportion to net contributions on deposit unless clear and convincing evidence exists of 
a different intent); In reEstate of Thompson, 66 Ohio St. 2d 433, -, 423 N.E.2d 90, 94 
(1981) (a joint account belongs to each depositor for so much as contributed during 
their.lifetimes unless clear and convincing evidence exists of a different intent); Isbell v. 
Wil.liams, 705 S.W.2d 252, 254 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986) (probate code established a rebut-
table presumption of ownership in favor of depositor during. his lifetime unless contrary 
intent is sliown);.see also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 658.55 (West 1984) (bank deposits made 
. in the names of two or more persons are payable to either during their lifetimes); N.Y. 
BANKING L. § 675 (McKinney 1971 & Supp. 1989) (all deposits in any form in a joint 
accoul\t are the property of all depositors as joint tenants and are payable to either or 
both during their lifetimes); TEX. PROD. CODE ANN. § 438 (Vernon 1980) (a joint ac-
count belongs to parties according to the net contributions of. each during their 
lifetimes). 
50. SeeM. RHEINSTEIN & M. GLENDON, THE LAW OF DECEDENTS' EsTATES 
612 (1971) (discussing the reluctance of many .people. to divest themselves of property 
prior to death). 
51. See, e.g., Briscoe v. Florida .Nat'! Bank, 394 So. 2d 492, 493 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1981) (eviden~e of a confidential relation'ship between defendant and a 98 year old 
decedent accompanied by defendant's procurement of a joint account created prima 
facia case of undue influence); In re Estate of Webb, 18 Ohio App. 2d 287, -, 249 
N.E.2d. 83, 93 (1969) (when creator of a joint account becomes incompetent, the co-
owner no longer has authority to withdraw funds during his lifetime prior to creator's 
death over his rightful share); In re Estate of Moore, 26 Ohio Op. 37, -, 188 N.E.2d 
221, 224 ( 1962) (a~ 'incompetent depositor could 'not ·make a· valid contract in a joint 
tenancy account with a right ofsurvivorship.; thus, monies did not pass to survivor on 
his death). 
52. See Cogdill v. First Nat'! Bank, 193 S.W.2d 701, 702 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946) 
(inter vivos gifts require delivery of subject matter by the donor to the donee and intent 
by the donor to vest 'in the donee unconditional and immediate ownership of property 
HeinOnline -- 43 Ark. L. Rev. 145 1990
1990] ANTE-MORTEM PROBATE 145 
probate, they are a poor substitute for ante-mortem probate. 
While outright gifts are irrevocable,53 wills which have been 
admitted to ante-mortem probate remain ambulatory. 54 Only 
individuals who are extremely wealthy or who are primarily 
concerned with decreasing the size of their estate for tax re-
duction purposes are willing to divest themselves of their own-
ership rights in significant amounts of property prior to death; 
people dislike placing themselves at the charity or. mercy of 
others. 55 As with the other two commonly used probate 
avoidance techniques, outright gifts may also be contested on 
various · grounds such as lack of capacity and undue 
influence. 56 
2. Self-Proved Wills 
Pursuant to the Uniform Probate Code, 57 as well as the 
probate statutes of many states, 58 a person may create a self-
proved will by executing a separate instrument, usually an affi-
davit, along with the will. The accompanying instrument, 
which is signed by the testator as well as the requisite numbe'r 
of witnesses, is then notarized. 59 · Although the self-proved 
delivered); CAL. CIV. CODE§ 1146-1148 (Deering 1988) (a gift is a voluntary, irrevoca-
ble transfer of personal property without consideration which requires actual or con-
structive delivery to donee). . · . 
53. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1148 (Deering '1988) (any gift other than that 
made in contemplation of death cannot be revoked by giver); OHIO REV. ConE ANN. 
§ 1339.33 (Baldwin 1988) (a gift or transfer made pursuant to certain statutory condi-
tions is irrevocable). · 
54. See ARK. CODE ANN.§ 28-40-203 (1987) ("validated wills may be modified or 
superseded"); N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-08.1-03 (Supp. 1989) (will is binding but may 
be altered in a subsequent ante-mortem proceeding); OHIO REV. ConE ANN. 
§ 2107.084(D) (Anderson Supp. 1988) (modification and revocation permitted). · 
55. SeeM. RHEINSTEIN & M. GLENDON, supra note 50, at 612 ("it is not to many 
people's taste to divest themselves ... of all property during their lifetimes and thus to 
throw themselves upon other people's trust or charity"). 
56. See, e.g., Estate of Truckenmiller, 97 Cal. App. 3d 326, 334, 158 Cal. Rptr. 
699, 704 (1979) (a gift may be set aside on the basis of undue influence by some act or 
conduct of donee but not on belief of donor alone); Randolph v. Randolph, 28 Misc. 2d 
66, -, 212 N.Y.S.2d 468, 471 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1961) (a gift induced by fraud may be 
rescinded); Pace v. McEwen, 574 S.W.2d 792, '794 (Tex. Cjv. App. 1978) (an aged and 
frail donor who acted without independent advise and who gave fiduciary stock leaving 
him in impoverished condition·was sufficient to suggest no intent to make gift). 
57. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-504 (1982). 
58. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 43-8-132 (Supp. 1985); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 474.337 
(Vernon 1989); TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. §59 (Vernon 1980). . 
59. See supra notes 11-13. · 
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will provides a presumption that the mechanical elements of 
the will have been satisfied, a contestant to the will may still 
prove fraud, forgery, and undue influence.60 While self-prov-
ing wills dispense with the need for witnesses at informal pro-
bate hearings, the affidavit only bolsters the will's validity 
establishing a prima facia case of proper execution. It does 
not, however, make a conclusive determination that a will is 
valid and binding as does ante-mortem probate. Hence, it 
cannot be a substitute for ante-mortem probate.61 
3. In Terrorem Clauses 
The use of in terrorem clauses is another method of dis-
couraging will contests in post-mortem proceedings. 62 This 
type of clause reduces the potential contestant's financial in-
centive to challenge the will by giving him a sizeable bequest 
provided he does not contest the will. Although typically this 
bequest is substantially less than his intestate share, it is con-
siderably more than what the contestant would receive if the 
challenge fails. 63 Many jurisdictions will only enforce these 
forms of "primitive coercion"64 under certain circumstances. 65 
60. See UNtF. PROB. CODE § -3-406 comment (1982) (self-proved will does not pre-
clude proof of undue influence, revocation, lack of capacity, or testator's lack of knowl-
edge of the natural objects of his bounty); TEx. PROB. CoDE ANN. § 59 (Vernon 1980) 
("a self-proved· will may be contested ... in exactly the same fashion as a will not self-
proved") . 
. 61. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 17, at 842-50 (ante-mortem proceedings best 
protect a testator's intent despite advocation of alternatives such as videotaped wills, 
self-proved wills, and in terrorem clauses); Langbein, supra note 34, at 70 (conclusive 
presumption afforded to self-proved wills expressly reserves a contestant's right to prove 
fraud or forgery). 
62. Comment, supra note 17, at 845-46, 851. 
63. See id. at 842-45, 851 (clause typically gives token amount to potential will 
contestants with condition precedent that there is no contest); see also Jack, No-Contest 
or In Terrorem Clauses in Wills-Construction and Enforcement, 19 Sw. L.J. 722, 723 
(1965) (no contest clause generally held valid and not against public policy). 
64. Leavitt, Scope anq Effectiveness of No-Contest Clauses in Last Wills and Testa-
ments, 15 HASTINGS L.J. 45, 45 (1963). 
65. see Broach v. Hester, 217 Ga. 59,-, 121 S.E.2d 111, 113 (1961) (in terrorem 
clause enforceable only where a testator specifies "gift-over"); Estate of Westfahl, 674 
P.2d 21, 23 (Okla. 1983) (clause is enforceable unless it is violation of public policy or 
law); Veltmann v. Damon, 696 S.W.2d 241, 246 (Tex. App. 1985) (in terrorem clause 
should be effective where the purpose of the contest is to thwart testator's intentions), 
aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 701 S.W.2d 247 (Tex. 1985). But see 
FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 732.517 (West 1976) (penalty for cost unenforceable). See generally 
Jack, supra note 63, at 726. 
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For example, a forfeiture may not occur if the contest is insti-
tuted in good faith and with reasonable cause.66 However, 
this conditional use opens the clause to attack by courts with 
liberal views as to what constitutes a "good faith contest."67 
The technical validity of a will is· not established by in ter-
rorem clauses. In fact, their use in a will may produce further 
claims of lack of capacity.68 Although in terrorem clauses 
may give some peace of mind to the fearful testator, they can-
not give the testamentary security established by ante-mortem 
proceedings. 
4. Videotaped Will Execution Ceremonies 
The fact that the testator cannot be present to testify at 
the probate hearing may be the weakest point in post-mortem 
systems. 69 If the will execution ceremony is preserved on 
videotape, the testator is effectively brought into the court-
room during a contest. Of course, the testator is not subject to 
cross examination. The videotape evidence may help to 
demonstrate the execution of the will, testamentary capacity, 
testamentary intent, the contents of the will, and lack of un-
due influence or fraud. 70 
An unaltered videotape is highly accurate, reflecting 
66. See Colorado Nat'! Bank v. McCabe, 143 Colo. 21, -, 353 P.2d 385, 392 
(1960) (forfeiture provision is not applicable where contest was brought in good faith); 
Haynes v. First Nat'! State Bank, 86 N.J. 163, -, 432 A.2d 890, 904 (1981) (in ter-
rorem clause is unenforceable where probable cause exists); Estate of Seymour, 93 N.M. 
328, -, 600 P.2d 274, 278 (1979) (bequest is not forfeited where contest is in good faith 
and with probable cause based on totality of circumstances); see generally Leavitt, supra 
note 64, at 67 n.87 (in terrorem clause penalty is ineffective for beneficiary who contests 
a will in good faith with probable cause to contest). 
67 .. See Estate of Westfahl, 674 P.2d 21,25 (Okla. 1983) (good faith offer of subse-
quent will does not invoke forfeiture even though subsequent will was not genuine); 
Wadsworth v. Brigham,- Or.-,-, 259 P. 299, 303-04 (1927) (good faith found and 
forfeiture not applicable where child filed contest who was not named in will); Estate of 
Kubick, 9 Wash. App. 413, -, 513 P.2d 76, 80 (1973) (contestant deemed to have acted 
"in good faith and for probable cause" where a suit brought on the advice of a fully 
informed attorney); see also Comment, supra note 17, at 845 (the value of an in terrorem 
clause is limited by what courts may deem as good faith grounds). 
68. Comment, supra note 17, at 845. 
69. See supra §II A & B. 
70. See, e.g., Beyer, Videotaping the Will Execution Ceremony-Preventing Frus-
tration of the Testator's Final Wishes, 15 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1, 5-7 (1983); Buckley & 
Buckley, Videotaping Wills: A New Frontier in Estate Planning, 11 OHIO N.U.L. REV. 
271, 278-80 (1984); Nash, A Videowi/1: Safe and Sure, A.B.A. J. Oct. 1984 at 87, 87-89. 
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events exactly as they occurred and eliminating the necessity 
of relying upon witnesses whose memories fade. and impres-
siOrJ.S change as time passes. 71 The t(lpe also preserves valua-
ble, non-verbal evidence such as demeanor, tone of voice, 
inflections, facial expressions, and gestures. However, this 
technique is not fool proof. The taping process entails addi-
tional costs. In addition, the tape may be altered or destroyed 
or even used to show the testator lacked the necessary capac-
ity to make a valid will. 72 . 
Despite the tremendous benefits of a videotaped will exe-
cution ceremony under a post-mortem probate system, it pales 
in comparison to ante-mortem probate. During an ante-
mortem probate proceeding, the actual testator is available for 
direct observation. The testator may be carefully examined, 
both physically and psychologically, and questioned prior to a 
ruling on his capacity and freedom from undue influence 
among other considerations. · 
Ill. EVOLUTION OF ANTE-MORTEM PROBATE 
· A. Biblical 
In many respects, ante-mortem probate is not a product 
of t~is century or even the previous one. One can find ancient 
laws and customs recorded in the Bible where a type of living 
validity of a will was used to facilitate inheritance. Several 
examples illustrate Biblical accounts of the unquestionable 
right of inheritance given before the death of the decedent. 
. Perhaps the most celebrated example can be found in the 
Book of Ruth in the Old Testament. 73 The customs of the 
time dictated that Ruth, a young widow, marry the nearest 
71. See McCrystal & Maschari, supra note 22, at 249-52 (I 980) (potential inaccu-
racies of human memory create inconsistencies, bias, prejudice, and inaccuracy which 
slow the administration of justice). 
72. In re Purported Last Will and Testament of Stotlar, No. 1149 (Del. Ch. 1987) 
(LEXIS, Del. Library), aff'd without opinion, 542 A.2d 358 (Del. 1988) (videotape of a 
will execution ceremony supported a finding of lack of testamentary capacity); In re 
Estate of Seegers, '733 P.2d 418, 421-22 (Okla. Ct. App. 1986) (videotape of a will exe~ 
cution ceremony supported a finding of undue influence). See generally Beyer, supra 
note 70, at .43-51 (d~scribing potential difficulties with videotaped will execution cere-
mony); Comment,' supra note 17, at 842-44 (describing the potential difficulties of using 
will execution videotape). 
73. Ruth 1-4: 
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eligible kinsman; 74 however, the one marked out for Ruth was 
of a different race and did not wish to marry her.75 Boaz, a 
gentle and compassionate, man wished to marry Ruth. 76 
Under the law regarding her deceased husband's estate, the 
first son born to a childless widow would inherit the first hus-
band's property. To facilitate Boaz's marriage to Ruth and 
resolve the inheritance problems, Boaz went before the elders 
with the kinsman who had the first right to marry Ruth and to 
claim the estate. They made a legal contract, evidenced by the 
passing of a shoe whereby the kinsman gave all rights of the 
first husband's estate to Boaz.77 
Another example is found in the book of Genesis. Dur-
ing the time of Isaac, a father passed his inheritance to his 
eldest son by blessing the son near the end of the father's life. 78 
Through an act of trickery and deceit, Jacob, a younger son, 
wearing a sheepskin to appear hairy like the elder son Essau, 
received the irrevocable blessing.79 One might view Jacob as a 
leader in using a living probate. In addition, when Jacob's 
eldest son, Rueben, shamed him by engaging in sexual rela-
tions with his concubine, 80 Jacob disinherited Rueben despite 
the laws of primogeniture. 81 
B. English Common Law 
There is evidence in the early development of English ec-
clesiastical law that a testament could be proved during the 
testator's lifetime at the testator's request. 82 Upon the testa-
tor's petition, the testament would be recorded and registered 
but would not be delivered under the seal of the Ordinary83 
with a probate and would have no effect until the testator ac-
74. /d. at 3:12-13. 
75. /d. at 4:6. 
76. /d. at 3:9-12. 
77. /d. at 4:7-10. 
78. Genesis 27:1-4. 
79. /d. at 27:5-38. 
80. /d. at 35:1-22. 
81. /d. at 35:22; 49:3-4. 
82. See H. SWINBURNE, A TREATISE OF TESTAMENTS AND LAST WILLS Part 6, 
§ 13, at 65-66 (1635) (photograph reprint 1979). 
83. An Ordinary is "[o]ne who had exempt and immediate jurisdiction in causes 
ecclesiastical." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 989 (5th ed. 1979). 
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tually died. 84 A will so recorded and registered could still be 
revoked or altered by the testator. 85 There appears to be little 
evidence of the effect of a pre-death registration on the dis-
gruntled heirs' ability to contest the testament after the testa-
tor's death. As the law evolved, pre-death procedures were 
abandoned and Ecclesiastical Courts were deemed to have ju-
risdiction only over the probate of deceased persons' wills. 86 
C. European Civil law 
While the Anglo-American legal system wrestled with 
problems triggered by post-mortem probate, the civil law sys-
tems of Europe developed the "authenticated will" which is 
executed before a quasi-judicial officer called a notary. 87 
Under the European notarial procedure, testators who are 
fearful of post-mortem contests can execute a will during their 
lifetime and have in their possession both the executed will as 
well as evidence of their capacity.88 Unlike notaries in the 
United States, European notaries hold a much higher position 
within the legal system. 89 The European or civil notary is a 
quasi-judicial officer, usually an attorney, who is experienced 
at determining the capacity of and influence upon the testator 
when the will is made. 90 Once the notary authenticates the 
84. See H. SWINBURNE, supra note 82, at 65-66. 
85. /d. 
86. See Allen v. Dundas, 3 T.R. 125, 130 (1789). 
87. See Langbein, supra note 34, at 65. See generally Brown, The Office of the 
Notary in France, 2 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 60, 66-71 (1953) (distinguishes notarie (notary) 
from French barrister avoue (organizes written argument)). 
88. See Langbein, supra note.34, at 63-71 (1978) (though not the only means of 
creating a valid will, the use of notaries is expensive and seldom used). 
89. See id. at 70 (European notaries are fully qualified lawyers and sworn officers 
of the State); see also Brown, supra note 87, at 60, 62 (a notary must comply with 
specific conditions of admission). French notaries are divided into three classes: 
"I) those practicing within the ressort or area of jurisdiction of a cour d'appel; 2) those 
practicing within the ressort of a tribunal de premiere instance; and 3) those practicing 
within the ressort of a tribunal de paix." /d. at 61. The conditions for admission as a 
notary are that the applicant I) is a French citizen, 2) has served his military obligation, 
3) is over 25 years of age, 4) has served the necessary apprenticeship duty in a notaries 
office, 5) has passed the professional examination, and 6) has received favorable com-
mendation from the President of the Chamber of Discipline on the applicant's moral 
fitness. ·/d. at 62. Additionally the notary must amass considerable wealth to begin his 
practice or buy an existing practice because every notary must have a separate charge. 
/d. He cannot work in partnership or be employed by another. /d. 
90. See Langbein, supra note 34, at 63-71 (1978) (a continental notary is obliged to 
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will, it is. given great credibility rendering it difficult to set 
aside in post-mortem proceedings.91 
When a will is deposited with a notary, strict guidelines 
govern the revocability of the instrument. 92 This act discour-
ages alteration or revocation of the will which, in turn, in-
creases the instrument's credibility.93 Therefore, the 
European authenticated will is generally immune from con~ 
test. 94 Although each country has different laws dealing with 
the authentication of wills, 95 those which employ the civil no-
tarial system offer a valuable lesson in resolving problems in 
our post-mortem systems. 
Of the proposals for ante-mortem probate raised in the 
United States during the 1930s,96 many were vaguely based on 
the civil notarial system of authenticated wills. This method 
tends to avoid the conflict of adversarial positions while pro-
viding the testator and his will with validity and credibility. 
satisfy himself of the testator's compliance with will formalities and the testator's iden-
tity when examining submitted authenticated testation). 
91. See id. (European law attaches an extremely strong presumption of validity to 
notary's authentication on premise that the notary is an expert in legal paperwork who 
takes statutory responsibilities seriously). There are four requirements . of an acte 
authentique within the French system: · 
I) that a public authority or officer has presided at its making; 
2) that the acte appertains to the attributes of the public authority or officer 
who has made or received it; 
3) that the authority or officer has the right to practice in the place where, 
and at the time when, the acte is passed, [and] 
4) that the acre is clothed with all requisite formalities. 
Brown, supra note 89, at 65. Thus, a notary's acte is conclusive evidence until it is 
impeached for falsity and is executory in itself. Id. · 
92. See Langbein, supra note 34, at 69 (a notary keeps the document in his posses-
sion to discourage ineffective experiments of altering will and to prevent tampering or 
forgery after document is notarized). 
93. See id. (a notarial deposit discourages the ineffective attempts of the testator to 
alter or revoke the will and to prevent accidental destruction, outright forgery, or unau-
thorized tampering after the document is authenticated). 
94. See id. at 65-66, 70 (a notary must satisfy himself of the testator's capacity to 
make will as a prerequisite to receive or transcribe the document; thus, the will is . 
granted a presumption of validity due to status of notary as expert in. legal paperwork). . 
95. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 89, at 60-71 (1953) (specifying the duties of a 
French notary in certifying a will as distinguished from the barrister, an avocat who 
presents only oral arguments to court for his client and the avoue, a public official who 
may make known to the court his client's complaint in written and authenticated form); 
4 MODERN LEGAL SYSTEM CYCLOPEDIA 114 (K. Reddened. 1984) (the differences 
and effects of Nonegasque law (Moroccan) in succession). 
96. See infra § III(G). 
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At a minimum, the European experience with ante-mortem 
probate is evidence that ante-mortem systems do work and 
that security, not present with the post-mortem process, 1s 
available. 
D. Michigan Statute of 1883 
In 1883, the Michigan legislature made a novel attempt 
to cope with the disruptive and uncertain post-mortem will 
contest by enacting one of the earliest ante-mortem statutes. 97 
The testator was authorized to petition the probate judge of 
the testator's county of residence asking for the will to be ad-
mitted and established as his last will and testament. 98 · The 
petition was required to contain averments that the will was 
executed by the testator "without fear, fraud, impartiality, or 
undue influence, and with a full knowledge of its contents."99 
In addition, the testator was required to allege that he was of 
sound mind and memory and had full testamentary capac-
ity.100 Accompanying the statements relating to the will's va-
lidity, the statute required the testator to supply the names 
and addresses of the individuals who would be the testator's 
heirs were he to die intestate and other persons whom the tes-
tator desired to be parties to the proceeding. 101 
The judge would then set a hearing date and issue cita-
tions to the parties named in the petition as well as direct that 
notice of the hearing be published. 102 After receiving proof 
that the citations were served and the notice published, the 
judge would conduct a hearing resembling a post-mortem pro-
bate proceeding. 103 At the hearing, the judge would inquire 
into all matters alleged in the petition. In addition, he was 
granted the authority to examine witnesses to ascertain rele-
97. See 1883 Mich. Pub. Acts 17. The text of the act is set forth in Fink, supra 
note 16, at 268-69 (reproduced in Appendix A). 
98. 1883 Mich. Pub. Acts 17, § 1. · 
99. /d. § 2. 
100. /d. 
101. /d. 
102. /d. § 3. 
103. /d. If any person named in the testator's petition was a minor or under a 
disability, the judge was required to appoint a guardian ad litem to represent them. /d. 
§ 4. 
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vant facts. 104 
If the judge determined · that the testator's allegations 
were true, he would issue a decree setting forth his findings. 105 
A copy of the decree would be attached to the will and certi-
fied under seal of the court. 106 This decree would have the 
same effect as a post-mortem decree and would be conclusive 
as to the matters stated therein. 107 The judge's decision was 
appealable in the same manner as a post-mortem probate de-
cree. 108 No restrictions were placed on the ability of the testa-
tor to revoke or alter the wilt: nor was re-use of the ante-
mortem procedure required. 109 . 
The usefulness of this innovative statute was short-lived. 
When Lloyd, a testator, presented his will for probate under 
the statute, the Michigan Supreme Court heard the case and 
declared the statute unconstitutional. 110 Two grounds were 
propounded for the statute's invalidity: (1) It enabled the tes-
tator to av9id the rights of a spouse and child; and (2) it failed 
to provide for finality of judgment. 111 One commentator has 
argued that the statute failed due to its poor drafting because 
it only provided for notice by citation to the heirs or other 
persons named in the petition. 112 The court specifically noted 
the statute's failure to provide notice and an opportunity to be 
heard by the testator's wife. 113 An additional weakness of the 
statute was its policy of determining a will to be valid, yet 
reserving in the testator the power to amend, revoke, or alter 
the will. The power of the testator to -change the adjudicated 
will was . fatal because it did not provide for ·finality of a 
' .. 
104. /d. § 4. 
105. /d. 
106. /d. 
107. /d. 
108. /d. § 5. 
109. /d. § 6. 
110. Lloyd v. Wayne Circuit Judge, 56 Mich .. 236, 239, 23 N.W. '28; 29 (1885). 
111. /d. at 238-39, 23 N.W. at 28-29; see also Comment, supra note 17, at 826-34 
(discussion of Lloyd and current proposals to overcome its criticisms). · 
112. See Comment, supra note 17, at 827 (although inchoate rights, such -as .dower 
and appointment of guardian for minors, are statutorily protected, Michigan statute did 
not require notice to wife before probate); see also Fink, supra note 16, at 269 (notice by 
citation provision was "self serving at best"). · 
113. Lloyd, 56 Mich. at 239, 23 N.W. at 29. 
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judgment. 114 
Judge Campbell, in a concurring opinion, advocated the 
rejection of ante-mortem probate outright. He stated that 
"the living can have no heirs" and noted that the will cannot 
be final until the death of the testator. 115 He felt that to deny 
this concept of law would undermine the ambulatory nature 
of a will. 116 Judge Campbell also expressed concern about the 
possible harm to a family which may flow from the ante-
mortem process. 117 
Another commentator has suggested that the criticisms 
of the statute in Lloyd fall into four basic categories and that 
subsequent ante-mortem statutes have been cautiously drafted 
to avoid these pitfalls. 118 Other commentators, while ac-
knowledging these criticisms, feel that the primary reason the 
statute was overruled was the court's belief that the process 
established was not a judicial one. 119 
At the time Lloyd was decided, the court did not perceive 
any adverse parties to the proceeding because the defendants 
were the presumptive heirs who had no legal interest in th~ 
outcome of the proceeding. 120 This problem arose because the 
proceeding lacked finality. The testator was free to revoke or 
change the will after the proceeding leaving his heirs uncer-
tain as to whether they would be recipients at his death. This 
dilemma led to the criticism that the living could have no 
heirs. 121 This concept prevented the proceeding from satisfy-
ing the constitutional test for jurisdiction which requires that 
courts hear only controversies between conflicting parties of 
114. See Comment, supra note 17, at 827. 
115. Lloyd, 56 Mich. at 240-41, 23 N.W. at 30; see also Comment, supra note 5, at 
719 n.l9 (unfounded challenges to post-mortem probate are motivated by monetary 
concerns or less worthy motivations arising out of embarrassment or anger when an 
heir receives little or nothing). 
116. Lloyd, 56 Mich. at 241, 23 N.W. at 30-31. 
117. !d. at 241-42, 23 N.W. at 30 (disappointed heirs would quarrel with testator). 
118. Comment, supra note 5, at 719 n.l9 (categories of criticisms are (I) the finality 
of judgment; (2) inchoate rights; (3) living have no heirs; and (4) the security of the 
testator). 
119. Edwards, Antemortem Probate and Judicial Power to Render or Refuse Declar-
atory Relief, 7 OHIO N.U.L. REV. 189, 189-91 (1980). 
120. Lloyd, 56 Mich. at 239, 23 N.W. at 28-29; see also Edwards, supra note 119, at 
190. 
121. Lloyd, 56 Mich. at 240, 23 N.W. at 30 (Campbell, J., concurring). 
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interest. 122 The Lloyd' court felt that allowing a judicial deter-
mination in such a situation would be paramouni to issuing an 
advisory opinion· · which was prohibited by Michigan's 
constitution. 123 
In 1937, the United States Supreme Court spoke to clar-
ify the issue of a court's authority to issue a declaratory opin-
ion. 124 By its decision, the Court ratified the Declaratory 
Judgment Act and gave a new spark of hope for ante-mortem 
solutions to post-mortem problems. 
E. Use of Declaratory Judgments 
When the Michigan Supreme Court held that the 1883 
ante-mortem statute was unconstitutional, reliance was placed 
on the controlling law of the time which set forth the prereq-
uisite of a "case or controversy" before judicial power could 
be invoked. 125 The court stated that a will could not be de-
clared judicially valid when the testator could later revoke or 
modify the same instrument. Therefore, a judicial declaration 
would not create the level of finality required of proper judi-
cial determinations.1.26 In 1885, declaratory judgments were 
considered to be outside the realm of judicial competence. 
Even as late as 1920, the Michigan Declaratory Judgment Act 
was held to be unconstitutional for authorizing judicial opin-
ions.127 The courts were still being strangled in their role as 
conflict resolvers, having to wait until a situation had erupted 
122. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 96 (1968) (federal law of justiciability prohib-
its issuance of advisory opinions); Liberty Warehouse Co. v. Grannis, 273 U.S. 70, 75 
(1927) (no justiciable controversy based on uncertain or hypothetical set of facts). 
123. Lloyd, 56 Mich. at 239, 23 N.W. at 29 (no authority exists for circuit court to 
decide cases not properly judicial). 
124. See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 244 (1937) (upholding con-
stitutionality of Declaratory Judgment Act). 
125. Lloyd, 56 Mich. at 239, 23 N.W. at 29 (petitioner erroneously assumed judg-
ment was final although testator could change will at any time violating case or contro-
versy requirement). 
126. /d.; see also Edwards, supra note 119, at 189-91 (no finality of judgment where 
the testator remains free to modify or revoke judicially valid will). 
127. See Anway v. Grand Rapids Ry. Co., 211 Mich. 592, -, 179 N.W. 350, 360-
61 (1920) (the court cannot answer· abstract questions of law under the Declaratory 
Judgment Act because it does not confer judicial power to answer such questions; re-
quired performance of nonjudicial acts prohibited by Michigan Constitution). After the 
Michigan Legislature redrafted the Declaratory Judgment Act in 1929, the Act was 
found to be constitutional. See Washington-Detroit Theater Co. v. Moore, 249 Mich. 
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into a full-blown ·controversy before offering peaceable 
solutions. 
In 1937, ·the United States Supreme Court broke the 
shackles restraining judicial involvement by clarifying what 
constitutes a "controversy." In Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. 
Haworth, 128 the Court held that the Federal Declaratory Judg-
ment Act (FDJA) did not create new substantive rights; 
rather, the FDJA was a procedural tool for dealing with con-
troversies in the constitutional sense. 129 On this latter point, 
the Court said: 
A controversy in this sense must be one that is appropri-
ate for judicial determination ... A justiciable controversy 
is thus distinguished from one that is academic or moot 
. . . The controversy must be definite and concrete touch-
ing the legal relations of parties having adverse legal inter-
ests . . . It must he a real and substantial controversy 
admitting of specific relief through a decree of a conclu-
sive character, as distinguished from an opinion advising 
what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of 
facts. 130 
This development opened the door to the use of declaratory 
judgments when a court made a determination regarding the 
validity of a will and l~gal rights stemming from it. Yet, three 
other issues still needed clarification after declaratory judg-
ments were approved before drafters could . solve the ante-
mortem puzzle with a declaratory solution: 1) the require-
ments of "ripeness, sufficiency and adversity of the parties;" 131 
2) an actual concrete controversy; and 3) finality of ·the 
judgment. 132 
673, -, 229 N.W. 618, 621 (1930) (redrafting eliminated prior constitutional 
infirmities). 
128. 300 U.S. 229, 240-41 (1937) (a controversy must be. definite and concrete, 
touching legal rights of parties with adverse legal interests). 
129. Id. at 240; Edwards, supra note 119, at 191. 
130. Aetna Life Ins. Co.· v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 229, 240-41 (1937) (citatio~s 
omitted). · 
131. For example, can a person have the validity of his will examined if there is no 
one of record opposing his doing so? If the answer is no, then the testator would be 
refused such determination and, provided the would-be heir keeps quiet until the testa-
tor's death, an heir could then use the testator's repetitive attempts to validate his will 
by ante-mortem procedures to indicate his lack of capacity. 
132. Edwards, supra note 119, at 192 (Ohio Declaratory Judgment Act imposes 
similar limitations parallel to federal constitutional requirements). 
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Several states have attempted to overcome the&e proc·e-
dural hurdles by enacting specific· ante-mortem. legislation. 133 
Other jurisdictions, despite adoption of statutes authorizing 
declaratory judgments, 134 do not grant jurisdiction to any spe-
cific court to determine the validity of a living testator's 
wil1. 135 For example, in the Texas case of Cowan v. Cowan, 136 
133. See infra § V(A), (B), & (C) discussing the statutes of North Dakota, Ohio, 
and Arkansas. · 
134. See UNIF. DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS ACT §§ 1-17 (1975). The Uniform 
Declaratory Judgments Act has been adopted in 40 states. See ALA. CoDE §§ 6-6-220 
to -232 (1977); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-1831 to -1846 (West 1982)i ARK. CODE 
ANN. §§ 16-llll-101 to -lll (1987); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 13-51-101 to -liS (1987); 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 6501-6503 (Supp. 1988); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 86.0ll-.111 
(West 1987); GA. CODE ANN.§§ 9-4-1 to -10 (1982); IDAHO CODE§§ 10-1201 to -1217 
(1979); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-701 (Smith-Hurd 1983); IND. CODE ANN. 
§§ 34-4-10-1 to -16 (Burns 1986); LA. CODE Civ. PROC. ANN. arts. 1871-18S3 (West 
1961); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, §§ 5951-5963 (1980); Mo. CTs. & Jyo. PRoc. 
CODE ANN.§§ 3-401 to -415 (1984); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 231A, §§ 1-9 (Law. Co-op. 
1986); MINN. STAT. ANN.§§ 555.01-.16 (West 1988); Mo. ANN. STAT.§§ 527.010-.140 
(Vernon 1953 & Supp. 1988); MONT. CODE ANN. 27-8-101 to -313 (1987); NEB. REV. 
STAT.§§ 25-21,149 to ,164 (1985); NEV. REV. STAT.§§ 30.010-.160 (1987); N.J. STAT. 
ANN.§§ 2A:l6-50 to -62 (West 1978); N.M. STAT. ANN.§§ 44-6-1 to -15 (1978); N.C. 
GEN. STAT. §§ 1-253 to -267 (1988); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 32-23-01 to -13 (1976); 
OHIO REV. CoDE ANN. §§ 2721.01-.15 (Baldwin 1984); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, 
§§ 1651-1657 (West 1980); OR. REV. STAT.§§ 28.010-.160 (1983); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 7531-7541 (Purdon 1982); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 9-30-1 to -16 (1985); S.C. 
CODE ANN. §§ 15-53-10 to -140 (Law. Co-op. 1977); S.D. Coo.IFIED LAWS ANN. 
§§ 21-24-1 to -16 (1987); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 29-14-101 to -113 (1980); TEX. CIV. 
PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 37.001-.011 (Vernon 1986); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-
33-1 to -13 (1987); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 4711-4725 (1973); VA. CODE ANN. 
§§ 8.01-184 to -191 (1984); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.§§ 7.24.010-.144 (1961); W.VA. 
CODE§§ 55-13-1 to -16 (1981); WIS. STAT. ANN.§§ 806.04 (West 1977 & Supp. 1988); 
WYO. STAT.§§ 1-37-101 to -115 (1988); see a/so IOWA R. CIV. P. 261-269. Two United 
States territories have also adopted this uniform act. See P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 32, App: 
III, Rule 59 (1984); V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 5, §§ 1261-1272 (1967). 
135. But see Richardson v. First Nat') Life Ins. Co., 419 S.W.2d 836, 837-38 (Tex. 
1967) (residual jurisdiction exists solely in Texas district courts only where remedy or 
jurisdiction is not provided for by law or by constitution); Shelvin v. Lykos, 741 S.W.2d 
178, 186 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987) (Evans, C.J., dissenting) (the trial court did not have 
constitutional jurisdiction to order taking and testing of blood because jurisdiction had 
not been granted by the Texas Constitution, law, or other authority). The concept of 
residual jurisdiction vests a particular court of the state with general exclusive jurisdic-
tion over causes of action for which jurisdiction is not given to any other court by 
constitutional decree or statutory delegation. See Super X Drugs v. State, 505 S.W.2d 
333, 336 {Tex. Civ. App. 1974). Once jurisdiction attaches, the district court is empow-
ered to hear and determine the controversy and carry to execution the judgment of the 
court. Cleveland v. Ward, 116 Tex. I, 9, 285 S.W. 1063, 1069 (1926). The basis for 
residual jurisdiction in Texas exists in both the Constitution and statute. See TEx. 
CONST. art. V, § 8 (1891, amended 1985); TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 24.008 (Vernon 
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two children asked that their mother's will be declared invalid 
through a declaratory judgment proceeding. The applicable 
Texas statute provided that an interested person under a will 
could have a court determine questions regarding the validity 
of the instrument. 137 Despite the apparently direct language 
of the Texas statute, the beneficiary of the will argued that 
jurisdiction could not be awakened in any Texas court to de-
termine the purported will's validity because the testatrix was 
still living. 138 In spite of the language expressed in the statute, 
the appellate court held: 
Prior to the enactment of the Uniform Declaratory Judg-
ments Act, no court in Texas had the power to determine 
the validity of the will of a person still alive, nor in our 
opinion, does any court in this state now have that juris-
diction [after the enactment of the act]. 139 
The Texas court, as justification of its holding, went on to 
quote the well known maxim that "[u]ntil a man dies it is not 
known who his heirs will be .... " 140 Referring to the Lloyd 
case, the court reiterated that judicial power is confined to 
controversies between conflicting parties in interest and that 
the ripeness requirement could never exist between a living 
man and his possibl~ heirs. 141 Absent a statute expressly con-
ferring such jurisdiction, the court held that there was no judi-
cial authority to hear a suit to establish or annul the will of a 
living person. 142 
1988). Although the explicit language of the 1891 Constitution providing for residual 
jurisdiction was deleted by the 1985 amendment, the proposed change was for simplifi-
cation purposes only. See 1985 TEx. GEN. LAws 3357, 3357-58. The Texas Govern-
ment Code currently provides that "[t]he district court may hear and determine any 
cause that is cognizable by courts of law or equity and may grant any relief that could 
be granted by either courts of law or equity." TEx. Gov'T CoDE ANN. § 24.008 
(Vernon 1988). As long as the elements mandated by a declaratory judgment are met, 
the district court provides the proper forum for adjudicating the rights of a testator in 
an ante-mortem proceeding. 
136. 254 S.W.2d 862 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952). 
137. UNIF. DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS ACT, ch. 164, §§ 1-17 (1943); 1943 TEX. 
GEN. LAws 265, 265-66, repealed by Act of May 17, 1985, ch. 959, § 9( 1 ), reprinted in 
1985 TEX. GEN. LAWS 3242, 3322 (now codified at TEX. CI~ PRAC. & REM. CODE 
ANN. §§ 37.003-.004 (Vernon 1986)). 
138. Cowan, 254 S.W.2d at 863. 
139. /d. 
140. Jd. 
141. Jd. 
142. Jd. 
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The ~ourt also discussed whether the declaratory judg-
ment statute conferred authority upon Texas courts to deter-
mine a person's interests under the will of a living person and 
stated that the statute did not create any new substantive 
rights because it viewed the act as "only remedial in nature 
and procedural in character." 143 Hence, the statute did not 
give Texas courts jurisdiction over matters not within jurisdic-
tional limits prior to the statute's enactment. Rather, the stat-
ute only granted a new method of exercising existing 
jurisdiction. 144 The court concluded that the matter in Cowan 
was not justiciable; therefore, it should be dismissed. 145 
As a result of Cowan, Texas lawmakers, like those in 
many other states, were faced with overcoming the steadily 
solidifying principle that no one has an interest in a will before 
the testator's death. 146 Until a justiciable interest or issue is 
present, neither the probate nor district court could have juris-
diction. 147 Although declaratory judgments seemed to offer 
the courts the ability to begin an ante-mortem probate system, 
courts were not anxious to adopt the use of declaratory judg-
ments in the context of pre-death probate. It seemed that a 
statute or perhaps a constitutional amendment expressly giv-
ing jurisdiction to the courts to hear ante-mortem cases would 
be required. 148 
F. Wills of American Indians 
In 1910, Congress enacted a kind of ante-mortem probate 
applicable to certain Indian tribes under the guardianship of 
the federal government. 149 This procedure permitted an In-
143. /d. at 864 .. 
144. /d. (the act is procedural only and offers no new jurisdiction). 
145. /d. at 865. 
146. See 51 AM. JUR. Wills § 765 (1948) (absence of parties in interest results from 
maxim that a living person has no heirs or legatees). 
147. See id. (public policy makes void any attempt to compel testator to "enter 
upon a contest of his will" with individuals who are devoid of any interest in testator's 
estate until his death). 
148. See Cowan v. Cowan, 254 S.W.2d 862, 863 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952) (absent a 
statute expressly conferring judicial power on a particular court, Texas courts do not 
possess power to determine living testator's will) (citing 57 AM. u~. Wills § 765 
(1948)). 
149. Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 431, § 1, 36 Stat. 886 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 373 
(Supp. 1988)). 
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dian whose will disposed of certain allotments held under 
trust by the government to have the Secretary of the Interior 
approve his will prior to death. 150 The Secretary of the Inte-
rior was under a duty to "ascertain whether the Indian's sig-
nature [was] genuine, to make a full investigation into the 
mental competency of the testator and of all circumstances 
which induced its execution, and where natural heirs [were] 
cut off he must ascertain the reason." 151 The Secretary's ap-
proval was final unless fraud was discovered in connection 
with the execution or procurement of the will within one year 
after the testator's death. 152 A contemporary commentator 
heralded this advancement as demonstrating the practicality 
and value of ante-mortem probate. 153 
The potential for extensive development of this ante-
mortem technique, however, was never realized .. Although 
the 1915 regulations governing the Interior Department's ap-
proval of wills provided little guidance as to ante-mortem pro-
ceedings, 154 the 1923 regulations indicated that the preferred 
practice was not to approve a will before the testator's 
death. 155 In the event that an Indian submitted a will during 
his lifetime, the Office of the Interior was only to examine the 
form of the will and return it to the Superintendent who 
would retain the will until the testator's death. At the death 
of the t.estator, the will would be resubmitted for considera-
tion. 15~ This restriction on any true ante-mortem probate has 
. ' . 
150. /d. 
151. Lewis, Ante Mortem Probate of Wills and Testaments, 50 AM. L. RE:v. 742, 
744 (1916). 
152. Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 431, § 1, 36 Stat. 855, 855-56 (codified at 25 U.S.C. 
§ 373 (Supp. 1988)); Lewis, supra note 151, at 744. · 
153. Lewis, supra note 151, at 744 ("These Indian wills possibly present the only 
instance of the ante~mortem system but they seem to demonstrate its practicability and 
its value."). . 
154. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, UNITED STATES INDIAN SERVICE, DETER-
MINATION OF HEIRS AND APPROVAL OF WILLS,§ 3 (1915) [hereinafter DEPARTMENT 
OF THE INTERIOR], reprinted in W. FRANCISCO, FEDERAL INDIAN PROBATE LAW 150, 
151·(1979) (mere mention that Secretary of Interior may approve will before testator's 
death). · · · 
155. DEPARTMENT OF TiiE INTERIOR, supra note 154, at § 37, reprinted in W. 
FRANCISCO, supra note 154, at 170. See generally id. at 60 (discussing how 1923 Regu-
lations limited practice of approving wills prior to testator's death). 
156. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, supra note 154, at § 37, reprinted in W. 
FRANCISCO, supra note 154, at 170. 
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been continued by subsequent regulations. 157 
G. Renewed Interest in the 1930s 
After .a period of disenchantment followed by disinterest, 
ante-mortem probate was revived in the 1930s. The National 
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws created 
a special committee to draft a uniform act to establish wills 
before the death of the testator. 158 The Committee proposed 
two methods. The first permitted the testator simply to file 
the will for safe keeping with the clerk of the court. 159 The 
second method, described below, was a true ante-mortem pro-
bate procedure. 160 
The first tentative draft of the act which delineated the 
true ante-mortem probate, procedure provided that the testa-
tor could initiate the ante-mortem process by filing his will in 
a package under seal with the clerk of the court together with 
a list of the witnesses to the wil1. 161 The testator would then 
supply a petition naming his spouse and prospective heirs as 
defendants. 162 Assuming the petition was filed in a court with 
appropriate jurisdiction, the court would issue service of pro-
cess tQ the named defendants. 163 If any process was returned 
unserved, notice by publication would be substituted. 164 
. . 
. 157. See 43 C.F.R. § 4.260(b) (19~8) (current regulation regarding care of an In-
dian's will). The current provision states in part: 
When an Indian executes a will and submits the same to the Superintendent of 
the Agency, the Superintendent shall forward it to the Office of the Solicitor 
for examination as to adequacy of form, and for submission by the Office of the 
Solicitor to the Superintendent of any appropriate comments. The will or cod-
icil or any replacement or copy thereof may be retained by the Superintendent 
at the request of the testator or testatrix for safekeeping. A will shall be held 
in absolute confidence, and no person other than the testator shall admit its 
existence or divulge its contents prior to th~. death of the testa~or." 
Id. (emphasis added). · · 
158. Martin, Report of Special Committee on Uniform Act to Establish Wills Before 
Death of Testator, 9 A.L.I. PROC. 463 (1932). '· 
159. Id. 
160. Id. The Committee's researcp indicated that no state currently had a true 
ante-111ortem procedure. !d. at 464. . 
161. First Tentative Draft of Uniform Act to Establish Wills before Death of Testa-
tor§ 2(b), 9 A.L.I. PROC. 465 (1932). 
162. Id. § 3. The form statute also contained a form for the testator to use. ld. 
163. fd. 
164. Id. The court would appoint a guardian ad litem for minors and those under a 
disability. Id. 
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After proper notice was given, a hearing would be con-
ducted to determine whether the will should be admitted to 
ante-mortem probate. I65 If the will was admitted, the testator 
would be 
conclusively presumed to have executed the writing as and 
for his will as of the said filing, without fear, fraud, impor-
tunity or undue influence, and with a full knowledge of its 
contents, and that he was of sound mind and memory and 
full testamentary capacity and that he executed the same 
in the presence of each of the witnesses who signed the 
will as a witness, in the presence and at the request of the 
testator and in the presence of each of the other witnesses 
and that it was sealed in the presence of all of the 
witnesses.I 66 
Any aggrieved party would have the right to appeal the 
court's judgment. 167 If the testator wished to revoke the will, 
he could either file a written withdrawal which automatically 
revoked the will, I68 or make a written revocation in a subse-
quent will or codicil.I69 There was no requirement that this 
action be brought to the court's attention. I70 
However, this tentative draft was not met with a positive 
response. One commentator believes that the Committee's 
work was undermined from the beginning . because of objec-
tions that the proposal would place the Commissioners "in the 
position of advocating new legislation rather than reforming 
current legislation."I 7I 
The concept of ante-mortem probate also received con-
siderable support in the writings of legal commentators in the 
early 1930s. 172 The most significant was a 1934 article by 
Duke University Professor David .F. Caversi 73 which made 
165. ld. 
166. Jd. § 2. 
167. ld. § 3. 
168. Jd. § 4. A form withdrawal was also supplied for the testator's use. 
169. ld. 
170. ld. 
171. Fink, supra note 16, at 289 (citing HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFER-
ENCE OF COMMISSIONERS AND UNIFORM STATE LAWS AND PROCEEDINGS, at 143 
(1931)). 
172. See, e.g., Redfearn, supra note 8, at 571; Cavers, supra note 7, at 440; Kut-
scher, Living Probate, 21 A.BA J. 427 (1935). 
173. Cavers, supra note· 7, at 440. 
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suggestions to avoid problems previously associated with ante-
mortem probate. 174 Cavers suggested that a will accompanied 
by a description of those persons being the next of kin or par-
ties dependent upon the testator could be submitted to a "Pro-
bate Officer." 175 The plan also called for the filing of a 
scriveners affidavit, as well as affidavits from three disinter-
ested witnesses who would comment on the testator's capac-
ity, the circumstances under which the will was drafted, and 
the existence of potential undue influence. 176 After consider-
ing the affidavits and interviewing the declarants and testator, 
the Probate Officer would then decide to allow or disallow 
ante-mortem probate. 177 Testators who were refused ante-
mortem consideration would be relegated to the traditional 
post-mortem process. Those for whom ante-mortem probate 
was allowed would have all of the evidence necessary to effec-
tuate their dispositive plans. The will and appropriate affida-
vits would be sealed and kept with the court for future use as a 
shield against unfounded contests in the post-mortem 
period. 178 
Cavers's approach was typical of other attempts at ante-
mortem probate which sprang up during the 1930s in that his 
approach attempted to correct the infirmities laid out in 
Lloyd. In addition, his approach tried to reduce the common 
problems with the post-mortem process. 179 Cavers's approach 
reduced the judicial interest complaint by removing the pro-
cess from the adversarial arena and placing the evidence gath-
ered in an administrative safe-house for the pending judicial 
battle. 180 Although the Cavers model did not solve the prob-
lem of the revocable will, revocation was · made more diffi-
174. See id. at 446-48 (suggesting the appointment of probate officer to determine 
validity of testator's will). 
175. /d. at 446. 
176. Id. 
177. See id. (if witnesses' opinions were inadequate to show testamentary capacity, 
a further opportunity should be given to the testator to furnish more qualified witnesses 
at a later hearing). 
178. /d. at 447. 
179. See, e.g., Cavers, supra note 7, at 440; Hulbert, Probate Psychiatry-A Nero-
Psychiatric Examination of Testators from the Psychiatric Viewpoint, 25 ILL. B.J. 288 
(1930); Kutscher, supra note 172, at 427; Redfearn, supra note 8, at 571. 
180. Cavers, supra note 7, at 440. 
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cult. 181 However, Cavers's approach has been criticized 
recently as denying potential intestate successors and other in-
terested persons the right to challenge the testamentary capac-
ity of the testator. 182 
Several other authors also wrote on ante-mortem probate 
during the 1930s. 183 For example, one commentator essen-
tially supported the program which Cavers proposed by en-
dorsing the civil law practice of authentication. 184 However, 
this system exists without the dependency on the collateral 
attack available in a post-mortem contest. 185 
H. Proposals for the Model and Uniform Probate Codes 
During the early 1940s, the drafters of the Model Probate 
Code (MPC) gave brief consideration to the possibility of in-
cluding provisions for ante-mortem probate. 186 The introduc-
tion to the MPC explains in terse language how the drafters 
carefully considered ante-mortem probate and concluded that 
"[t]he practical advantages of such a device are not great in 
181. /d. at 447-48. Cavers suggests alteration or revocation of the will by reapplica-
tion for ante-mortem probate, by preparation of a properly executed will utilized in 
post-mortem proceeding, or by operation of law on traditional grounds. /d. at 447. 
While opportunity should be given to an individual to attack the proceeding on grounds 
similar to an action to set aside a judgment, a challenge to the ante-mortem proceeding 
itself would be difficult. To sustain such a challenge, the plaintiff would need to prove a 
court has jurisdiction to decide matters regarding non-judicial proceedings, prove fraud 
or influence of the examiner, show the witnesses made substantial misstatements of fact 
(not opinion) or that the witnesses were impersonated by individuals without actual 
knowledge of the testator. /d. 
182. See Fink, supra note 16, at 288 (intestate successors "who have the most to 
lose" would not be contacted as to proceedings and they would be unable to challenge 
testamentary capacity of testator). 
183. See, e.g .. Hulbert, supra note 179, at 288; Kutscher, supra note 172, at 427; 
Redfearn, 'supra note 8, at 571. . 
184 .. Kutscher, supra note 172, at 427 (suggesting continued use of authentication 
used by civil systems). 
185. /d. at 429. Kutscher noted that use of ante-mortem probate would virtually 
eliminate post"mortem contests for challenges regarding the veracity of the testator's 
signature, the testator's capacity to make a will, or fraud in fact. /d. Other common 
post-mortem chJlllenges such as undue influence, fraud in the inducement, or lack of 
mental competency would greatly decrease if not eliminate these questions due to the 
presumption of regularity attached to the ante-mortem proceeding. !d.; see also Fink, 
supra note 16, at 289-90 (use of ante-mortem probate greatly decreases will contests, 
especially "laughing heir" contests). 
186. L. SIMES & P. BASYE, PROBLEMS IN PROBATE LAW 20 (1946) (containing 
text of MODEL PROBATE CODE). 
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view of the fact that few testators would wish to encounter the 
publicity involved in such a proceeding." 187 
In the early stages of the development of the Uniform 
Probate Code (UPC), the drafters again gave serious consider-
ation to inclusion of an ante-mortem procedure. 188 The proce-
dure faired better than the earlier MPC version as evidenced 
by the summer 1967 draft which contained provisions permit-
ting the testator to petition the court "for an order declaring 
that his Will has been duly executed and is his valid Will sub-
ject only to subsequent revocation." 189 This action would be 
declaratory in nature and would allow the testator to revoke 
the submitted will by a simple withdrawal or by a subsequent 
written will or codicil. 190 
The comments which accompanied the proposed sections 
reflected the benefits of ante-mortem probate. For example, 
one comment stated that ante-mortem probate is "often rec-
ommended and is of considerable attraction to the public. Its 
availability offers some insurance against unwarranted Will 
contests." 191 Despite the initial sanctioning of this progressive 
estate planning technique, the drafters omitted any reference 
to ante-mortem probate in subsequent drafts of the UPC. 192 It 
was not until almost a decade later that a significant resur-
gence of interest in ante-mortem probate occurred. 
IV. MODERN THEORIES OF ANTE-MORTEM 
PROBATE 
With the onset of the nation's bicentennial came a resur-
gence of interest in the field of ante-mortem probate. Between 
1976 and 1982, many articles were written expressing both the 
advantages and disadvantages of the ante-mortem alterna-
tive.193 During this period, writers addressed the four criti-
187. Id. 
188. W. ROLLISON, COMMENTARY ON THE UNIFORM PROBATE CODE 25 (1970). 
189. Summer, 1967, Draft of the Uniform Probate Code § 2-903, quoted in, W. 
ROLLISON, supra note 188. 
190. Jd. § 2-906, quoted in W. ROLLISON, supra note 188, at 26. 
191. Jd. 
192. W. ROLLISON, supra note 188, at 26. 
193. See, e.g., Fink, supra note 16, at 264 (advocating the "contest model" of ante-
mortem probate); Langbein, supra note 34, at 63 (advocating the "conservatorship 
model" of ante-mortem probate); Alexander & Pearson, Alternative Models of Ante-
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cisms of Lloyd: (1) inchoate rights; (2) the living have no 
heirs; (3) the security of the testator; and (4) the lack of en-
abling legislation. 194 From the above criticisms and difficul-
ties, three basic ante-mortem probate models emerged. 
A. The Contest Model 
The first model, proposed by Professor Howard Fink of 
Ohio State University, is closely related to the Michigan Act 
of 1883. This proposal places the testator and the prospective 
heirs in an adversarial situation which allows for a declaratory 
judgment. 195 Because of its adversarial nature, this proposal 
has been labeled the contest model. 196 The contest model re-
quires that standing be granted to all individuals who would 
be heirs by intestate succession as well as to all beneficiaries 
under the will. 197 In addition, unborn or unascertained heirs 
are protected by the appointment of a guardian ad litem or by 
the active protection of others under virtual representation 
concepts. 198 
After a will is executed under the contest model, the tes-
tator would bring suit in a court of competent jurisdict~on 199 
requesting that the court by declaratory judgment hold the 
will valid. To determine the will's validity, the court would 
consider the signatures, the number of witnesses to the will, 
the absence of undue influence, and the testamentary capacity 
of the testator. 200 All parties, including named beneficiaries 
and possible intestate successors would be notified of the pro-
ceeding.201 If the court determined that the will was valid, the 
Mortem Probate and Procedural Due Process Limitations on Succession, 78 MICH. L. 
REv. 89 (1979) (advocating the "administrative model" of ante-mortem probate). 
194. See Comment, supra note 17, at 830-32 (Fink's contest model was developed to 
respond to the four criticisms of Michigan Supreme Court in Lloyd). 
195. Fink, supra note 16, at 274-75 (proposed statute for ante-mortem probate). 
196. The label of "contest model" was given to Fink's proposal and similar adver-
sarial judgment-type suggestions in Langbein, supra note 34, at 63. 
197. See Fink, supra note 16, at 274-77. 
198. See id. at 274-75 (the interests asserted by the beneficiaries and heirs present 
would be sufficient to protect those with existing or future interests not present). 
199. Assuming that the legislature of the subject state would have designated a · 
court (i.e., probate), and have given it jurisdiction by statute. 
200. See Fink, supra note 16, at 274 (proposed model to remedy weaknesses of 
Michigan statute found unconstitutional in Lloyd). 
201. See id. at 274-75 (service would only be to those persons known to be within 
the state, out of state interest holders would be notified by publication). 
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will would be filed with the court. It could be nullified by 
repeating the process. 202 Arkansas, North Dakota, and Ohio 
have enacted statutes based on the contest model. 203 
While Fink's model offers some solutions to the problems 
of ante-mortem probate, it is expensive and it leaves many 
questions unanswered.204 However, the contest model solves 
the problem of finality by making the will binding on all par-
ties; it is susceptible to change only by a second judgment. 205 
Disclosure of the will's contents and the adversarial nature of 
the procedure which may cause unrest and disharmony be-
tween family and friends of the testator are the proposal's 
greatest flaws. 206 
B. The Conservatorship Model 
In 1980, Professor John Langbein of the University of 
Chicago attempted to solve the problems of the contest model 
with his proposal of the conservatorship model. 207 Like 
Fink's proposal, Langbein relies on a declaratory judgment to 
establish finality. 208 This model avoids the harsh sense of 
human greed and weakness involved in interfamiliallitigation 
by appointing a conservator. 209 The conservator litigates the 
interests of all the prospective heirs and beneficiaries. 210 Un-
fortunately, the conservatorship model is plagued with the 
problems of notice, jurisdictional function, and unrest caused 
by public disclosure of the contents of the will. 211 Because 
202. ld. at 275. 
203. See infra § V(A), (B) & (C). The proposal's exclusive intrastate notice provi-
sion makes questionable the effect of a judgment on an out-of-state interest holder. 
204. See Comment, supra note 17, at 836 (unanswered questions include: security 
of will's content from public disclosure; subsequent disinheritance for challenging origi-
nal will; strain on family due to adversarial nature of proceeding). 
205. Fink, supra note 16, at 275. 
206. See Comment, supra note 17, at 836 (listing contest model's weaknesses). 
207. Langbein, supra note 34, at 63. 
208. See id. at 80 (if the court is satisfied that testator has sufficient intent, an ante-
mortem judgment is entered conclusive on the points presented). 
209. See id. (appointment of guardian ad litem permits the development of incapac-
ity in closed setting avoiding an exaggerated adversary contest found in traditional post-
mortem litigation). 
210. /d. at 78. 
211. See id. at 78-79 (this may create a conflict of interest problem); see also Com-
ment, supra note 17, at 837 (conservatorship model deficiencies include jurisdiction and 
public disclosure of will's contents). 
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both the Fink and Langbein proposals rely on declaratory 
measures for resolution of the validity issues, the contest of 
the will under either proposal becomes part of the public rec-
ord. The repercussions on family life tend to make the pro-
posals poor public policy.212 
C. The Administrative Model 
Reflecting a significant departure from the contest and 
conservatorship models, University of Georgia Professors 
Gregory Alexander and Albert Pearson proposed ~he imple-
mentation of an administrative model of ante-mortem pro-
bate. This model envisions a two-step process: (1) the 
enactment of empowering legislation;213 and (2) the revision of 
the statutory conditions on the rights to contest a will. 214 
Under this theory, the ante-mortem experience would be 
neither judicial nor adversarial. The administrative model 
suggests an ex parte proceeding in which a testator and his 
circumstances are considered to answer the question of the 
will's validity rather than a system resembling an accelerated 
will contest.215 
The process begins with the testator petitioning the 
proper court for a determination of the validity of the will.216 
All functions of the court would be in camera and provide the 
privacy which is lacking with other models because the will 
would not become a matter of public record.217 Like the con-
servatorship model, a guardian ad litem would be appointed 
under the administrative model. However, this guardian 
would be an investigating agent of the court rather than a fi-
duciary of those holding prospective interests in the testator's 
estate. 218 Like an investigator, this guardian would privately 
interview the testator to determine the existence of undue in-
fluence or lack of capacity.219 Under this scheme, the guard-
212. See Comment, supra note 17, at 837 (discovery of will's contents by heirs dur-
ing testator's lifetime creates interfamilial tensions). 
213. Alexander & Pearson, supra note 193, at 112. 
214. /d. 
215. /d. 
216. Jd. 
217. Jd. 
218. Jd. 
219. Jd. 
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ian would not normally be informed of the contents of the 
will. The judge could, however, disclose any provisions of the 
will which are unusual, for example, those that disinherit 
close relatives or make large gifts to charity, so the guardian 
would be able to conduct a thorough investigation. 220 
This administrative proposal eliminates the necessity of 
giving notice of the proceeding to anyone except the guardian 
ad litem, 221 on the pretence that prospective heirs have no 
constitutional right to notice. Their potential interest in the 
testator's estate, were he to die intestate, is too weak to require 
notice. However, family members could receive indirect no-
tice of the ante-mortem probate prqceedings should they be-
come aware of the guardian ad litem's investigation. 
A determination by the court that the declarant is of 
sound mind and is acting free from undue influence does not 
determine the rights of persons having a potential interest in 
the estate. Therefore, the product of the process would be an 
order declaring the will free from testamentary defects and 
duly executed. 222 The authors of this proposal assert that be-
cause the right to contest the suggested proceeding is statutory 
and can be changed, the alterations of these statutes should 
make the administrative proposal functional and ·legal. 223 
V. THE ANTE-MORTEM EXPERIENCE 
Following rapidly on the heels of the renewed interest in 
ante-mortem probate exhibited at the end of the past decade, 
three states enacted ante-mortem statutes based on the contest 
model: North Dakota in 1977,224 Ohio in 1978,225 and Arkan-
sas in 1979.226 Simultaneously, the ation~l Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws drafted several ver-
220. !d. at 114. 
221. !d. at 115. 
222. !d. 
223. !d. at 117. 
224. 1977 N.D. Laws ch. 296, codified at N.D. CENT. CoDE§§ 30.1-08.1-01 to -04 
(Supp. 1987). 
225. 1978 Ohio Laws H. 505, codified at OHIO REV. CODE ANN.§§ 2107.081-.085 
(Anderson Supp. 1987). 
226. 1979 Ark. Acts 194, codified at ARK. CODE ANN.§§ 28-40-201 to -203 (1987). 
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sions of a Uniform Ante-Mortem Probate of Wills Act. 227 Af-
ter this auspicious beginning, enthusiasm for ante-mortem 
probate began to wane once again. No state has since enacted 
ante-mortem legislation and the National Conference .has 
abandoned its work on the Uniform Act.228 This section ana-
lyzes these acts and discusses the scant evidence which is 
available that concerns the use and. effectiveness of ante-
mortem probate. 
A. North Dakota 
1 . Analysis of Statute · 
The North Dakota Ante-Mortem Probate Act is a con-
cise statute providing a simple method for the testator to ob-
tain a declaratory judgment regarding various aspects of his 
will. 229 The Act authorizes the court to render a judgment 
declaring that particular requirements for a valid will have 
been satisfied. The types of matters for which a declaratory 
judgment may be obtained vary. They range from compliance· 
with formalities, such as the testator's signature and the re-
quired number of witnesses and their signatures, to elements 
of testamentary capacity and freedom from undue 
influence.230 
All of the beneficiaries named in the will, as well as those 
who would be intestate successors if the testator were to die, 
are necessary parties to the action. 231 To further solidify the 
standing of the testator's potential testate and intestate.takers, 
the Act declares that these people have inchoate property 
rights. 232 These parties are served with process under the nor-
mal North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure. 233 
If the court determines that the will was properly exe-
cuted and that the testator has testamentary capacity and was 
not unduly influenced, it declares that the will is valid and 
227. UNIF. ANTE-MORTEM PROB. OF WILLS ACT (N.C.C.U.S.L., Proposed Drafts 
A & B, 1980). 
228. Letter from Richard V. Wellman to Gerry W. Beyer (Oct. 7, 1987). 
229. N.D. CENT. CODE§§ 30.1-08.1-01 to -04 (Supp. 1987). This statute is repro-
duced in full in Appendix B. 
230. Id. § 30.1-08.1-01. 
231. Id. § 30.1-08.1-02. 
232. Id. 
233. Id. 
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orders that it be filed. 234 This will is then binding on all possi-
ble contestants unless and until the testator executes a new 
will and institutes a new ante-mortem proceeding which 
names both the appropriate parties to the new action as well 
as the parties to the former proceeding. 235 Thus, a subsequent 
will or written revocation is insufficient to negate the ante-
mortem probate. 
The ante-mortem proceeding is for the limited purpose of 
determining the will's validity. As a result, facts found in this 
proceeding are not admissible into evidence in any other ac-
tion. 236 In addition, the determination in the ante-mortem 
proceeding is binding on the parties to the action only in liti-
gation brought to determine the validity of a will; in all other 
cases, the same fact questions may be relitigated. 237 
2. Experience 
Despite being the oldest modem ante-mortem statute, be-
ing in effect for almost a dozen years, the North Dakota Ante-
Mortem Probate Act is rarely use.d. 238 When the Act is fol-
lowed, the proceedings appear to progress smoothly. There is 
some evidence that post-mortem contests have been avoided 
because the testator chose to use the Act. 239 There have been 
few, if any, contests of ante-mortem probate240 and no re-
ported cases were located which dealt with ante-mortem pro-
bate issues. 
B. Ohio 
1 . Analysis of Statute 
The Ohio statutes that provide for an ante-mortem decla-
ration of the validity of a will are the most detailed of the 
234. /d. § 30.1-08.1-03. 
235. /d. 
236. /d. § 30.1-08.1-04. 
237. Id. 
238: Letter from John M. Nilles to Gerry W. Beyer (Nov. 7, 1988). 
239. Letter from John M. Nilles to Gerry W. Beyer (Jan. 18, 1988) (discussing 
situation where ante-mortem probate of a will of testatrix who was marginally compe-
tent may have prevented post-mortem contest). 
240. Letter from John M. Nilles to Gerry W. Beyer (Nov. 7, 1988) (stating that 
what would have been North Dakota's first contested ante-mortem probate was shifted 
to a post-death proceeding because of plaintiff's death). 
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three states having ante-mortem legislation. 241 The substance 
of the Ohio provisions are basically the same as those of North 
Dakota; that is, an adoption ofthe contest model. However, 
the Ohio statute differs in its extensive procedural rules and in 
other important aspects. The most significant additions and 
changes made by Ohio to the North Dakota statute include: 
(1) Detailed venue rules;242 (2) extensive service of process 
rules;243 (3) comprehensive rules regarding petitions and hear-
ings to revoke or to modify a will which has been admitted to 
ante-mortem probate;244 (4) ~on-use of ante-mortem probate 
is inadmissible as evidence or as an admission that the testator 
lacked testamentary capacity or was unduly infiuenced;245 
(5) the will and a declaration of its validity are filed in a sealed 
envelope to which only the testator has access during his life-
time-if removed, the declaration of validity no longer has 
any effect;246 and (6) the testator may modify or revoke the 
will using any method allowed under Ohio law; a new ante-
mortem proceeding is not required. 247 
2. Experience 
'' 
Compared to those of North Dakota and Arkansas, the 
Ohio ante-mortem statutes have. generated the greatest use, 
perhaps owing to the larger .population of Ohio resulting in 
the increased interest in ante-mortem probate. 248 In Cooper v. 
Woodard, 249 an Ohio court of appeals was confronted with an 
attack on the constitutionality of the ante-mortem provisions. 
The court determined that the pleadings showed that ajustici-
241. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2107.081-.085 (Anderson Supp. 1987). This stat-
ute is reproduced in full in Appendix C. 
242. See id. § 2107.081(A) (venue is normally in probate court of county of testa-
tor's domicile). 
243. Id. § 2107.082. 
244. Id. § 2107.084(C). 
245. Id. § 2107.081(B). 
246. Id. § 2107.084(B). 
247. Id. § 2107.084(D). 
248. Population of Ohio as determined by the 1980 census was 10,798,000 as com-
pared to 653,000 for North Dakota and 2,286,000 for Arkansas. U.S. BUREAU OF THE 
CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1988 (108th ed. 1987). 
Several law review articles have focused on the Ohio enactment of ante-mortem probate 
while few, if any, have focused on the North Dakota or Arkansas statutes. See, e.g., 
Edwards, supra note 119; Comment, supra note 5; Comment, supra note 17. 
249. 1983 WL 6566 (Ohio Ct. App.). 
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able controversy existed and that "[e]xcept for legislation af-
fecting the right of free speech, assembly, etc., and those rights 
attendant to keeping open the channels for change of govern-
ment, legislation is presumed to be constitutional. " 250 Be-
cause the court found nothing in the record of the case to 
rebut the presumption of constitutionality, the Ohio ante-
mortem statutes were held to pass constitutional muster. 251 In 
addition, the court affirmed the lower court's refusal to enter-
tain a motion regarding the interpretation of the will by 
stressing that the sole purpose of the ante-mortem proceeding 
is to determine the validity of a will. 252 
Another Ohio court confronted the problem of whether 
the admission of a will to ante-mortem probate was proper 
under the particular facts of Fischer v. Greene. 253 The court 
held that ante-mortem probate was proper even though the 
testatrix had been previously determined to be sufficiently 
mentally incompetent so that a guardian was needed. 254 Be-
cause the testatrix was shown to have. testamentary capacity 
by her knowledge that she was executing a will; her knowl-
edge of the objects of her bounty, and her knowledge of the 
nature of her property, a determination of the validity of the 
will was proper.255 
Despite the greater awareness of the ante-mortem pro-
bate alternative in Ohio, it nonetheless appears that the statute 
is infrequently used. 256 In the first eight years of its availabil-
ity, approximately eight ante-mortem probate cases were filed 
250. Id. 
251. Jd. 
252. Jd .. 
253. No. 82-CA-71 (Ohio Ct. App. April 8, 1983). 
254. Jd. 
255. Jd. Other Ohio courts have cited the ante-mortem provisions but were not 
called upon to resolve ante-mortem issues. See Coleman v. Rawa, 1985 WL 4442 (Ohio 
Ct. App.) (declaratory judgment that decedent concealed property); Corron v. Corron, 
40 Ohio St. 3d 75, -, 531 N.E.2d 708, 710 (1988) ("whether the probate court has 
jurisdiction to render a declaratory judgment regarding the validity of a will not admit-
ted to probate and the legal status of certain inter vivos transfers by the testator of 
property unrelated to the administration of the estate"). 
256. Letter from Marvin R. Pliskin to Gerry W. Beyer·(Nov. 29, 1988) (discussing 
belief that ante-mortem probate is "very sparingly used"); Letter from Judge Richard B. 
Metcalf to Gerry W. Beyer (Oct. 6, 1987) (indicating that in his experience as Probate 
Court Judge of Franklin County, Ohio ante-mortem probate "has very little use"). 
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in Franklin County, one of Ohio's largest counties. 257 · It is 
believed that even fewer cases were filed in other counties. 258 
The statute appears to be used most frequently when an attor-
ney has prepared a will for a person who is under guardian-
ship or who is elderly.259 Few applications are denied because 
lawyers usually pre-screen clients to determine if they are rea-
son'ably competent before attempting to use ante-mortem 
probate. 260 
C. Arkansas 
1 . Analysis of Statute 
In 1979, Arkansas became the third and most recent state 
to enact ante-mortem legislation. 261 Although the Arkansas 
Ante-Mortem Probate Act is closely modeled after the North 
Dakota provisions; several important changes were made. 
First, the Arkansas Act is more broadly phrased to permit 
declaratory judgments concerning the validity of the will 
rather than limiting the action to specific aspects of the will's 
validity. 262 Second, and perhaps of greater significance, the 
Arkansas Act employs a more liberal approach to modifica-
tion and revocation. For example, an ante-mortem probated 
will "may be modified or superseded by subsequently executed 
valid wills, codicils, and other testamentary instruments, 
whether or not validated" with ante-mortem proceedings. 26~ 
However, the Arkansas Act does not address whether a revo-
cation by physical act is permitted because the statute only 
257. Letter from Judge Richard B. Metcalf to Gerry W. Beyer (Oct. 6, 1987). 
258. Id. 
259. Id. 
260. !d. 
261. ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-40-201 to -203 (1987). This statute is reproduced in 
full in Appendix D. 
262. Compare ARK. CoDE ANN. § 28-40-202(a) (1987) (declaratory judgment to 
establish validity of will) with N.D. CENT. CoDE§ 30.1-08.1-01 (Supp. 1987) (declara-
tory judgment permitted regarding the "signature on the will, the required number of 
witnesses to the signature and their signatures, and the testamentary capacity and free-
dom from undue influence of the person executing the will") .. Cf. OHIO REV. CODE 
ANN. § 2107.084 (Anderson Supp. 1987) (declaratory judgment allowed regarding 
whether will was executed pursuant to statutory formalities, testator had requisite testa-
mentary capacity, and was free from undue influence). 
263. Compare ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-40-203(b) (1987) with N.D. CENT. CODE 
§ 30.1-08.1-03 (Supp. 1987) (ante-mortem probated will remains binding unless new 
ante-mortem proceeding). 
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applies to subsequently executed testamentary instruments. 264 
Third, the Arkansas Act does not prohibit findings of fact in 
ante-mortem actions from being used in other proceedings. 265 
2. Experience 
The Arkansas Ante-Mortem Probate Act seems to be vir-
tually ignored. 266 No reported cases were located which dealt 
with ante-mortem probate issues. One Arkansas practitioner 
speculates that although the ante-mortem statute is important, 
most testators do not wish to disclose the contents of their 
wills; therefore, they do not elect to use this estate planning 
technique. 267 
D. National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform 
State Laws 
Responding to the renewed interest in ante-mortem pro-
bate reflected by ·both state legislatures and legal commenta-
tors, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform 
State Laws began the task of investigating the feasibility of 
ante-mortem probate in 1979.268 By late 1980, the Uniform 
Ante-Mortem Probate of Wills Act drafting committee con;. 
sidered two proposals: (1) a declaratory judgment/contest 
model format developed by the Joint Editorial Board-Uni-
form Probate Code (Draft A) and; (2) an administrative 
model based on the writings of Professors Alexander and 
Pearson269 drafted by the Ante-Mortem Probate of Wills Act 
Committee (Draft B). 270 
264. ARK. CoDE ANN.§ 28-40-203(b) (1987). The Ohio statute permits revocation 
of an ante-mortem probated will by any statutorily authorized method. OHIO REv. 
CODE ANN. § 2107.084(D) (Anderson Supp. 1987). 
265. Compare ARK. CoDE ANN. § 28-40-203 (1987) (no limitation on use of court 
findings) with N.D. CENT. CODE§ 30.1-08.1-04 (Supp. 1987) (findings of fact not ad-
missible in other proceedings). 
266. ·Letter from Jean D. Stock_burger to Gerry W. Beyer (Nov. 8, 1988). 
267. Id. 
268. Letter from Richard V. Wellman to James R. Wade 1-2 (Oct. 12, 1981) (Con-
ference's Scope and Program Committee declined to give its go-ahead recommendation 
in August 1978; the matter was resubmitted and approved in 1979). 
269. UNIF. ANTE-MORTEM PROB. OF WILLS AcT § 1 comment(N.C.C.U.S.L., 
Proposed Draft B, 1980). See generally supra § IV(C). 
270. Memorandum from Gregory S. Alexander to Drafting Committee, UNIFORM 
ANTE-MORTEM PROBATE OF WILLS ACT 1 (Oct. 15, 1980). 
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1. Draft A-A Contest Approach · 
Draft A reflects the contest. approach and was derived 
from the North Dakota, Ohio, and Arkansas statutes which 
were already in effect. 271 The most significant difference be-
tween these state statutes and Draft A is that under Draft A's 
procedure ·any judgment which the testator obtained declaring 
that his will had been duly executed and is his valid will sub-
ject only to revocation, would not be binding on the testator's 
spouse and decedents. 272 Thus, the utility of ante-mortem 
probate under Draft A was severely limited because the testa-
tor's spouse and children are the most likely individuals to 
contest a will especially if they are given less than the amount 
they would receive under intestacy. 
To begin the ante-mortem process under Draft A, the tes-
tator would file a petition containing a copy of the will along 
with allegations that the will is a properly signed and wit-
nessed will which was executed with testamentary intent and 
that the testator had testamentary capacity, free will, and fa-
miliarity with its contents. 273 
The defenda~ts to the declaratory judgment action would 
be "a representative group named from among the heirs pre-
sumptive of the [testator] and others who, as devisees under 
earlier wills of the [testator] or for other reasons, appear to 
have some prospect of being selected as devisees of the [testa-
tor]."274 If the presumptive heirs are the testator's spouse or 
descendents, then the defendants would be chosen from those 
who would be the testator's presumptive heirs if the testator 
had no spouse or descendants. 275 All of the potential defend-
ants would be named as defendants if their number were 
small. If the number of potential defendants were large, then 
several would be sued on behalf of them all. 276 If all potential 
defendants are not joined, the court must find that those 
joined would adequately protect all parties with· similar 
271. /d. 
272. UNIF. ANTE-MORTEM PROD. OF WILLS. ACT§ 1(a) (N.C.C.U.S.L., Draft A, 
Noy. 1980). The complete text ofthis draft act is reproduced in Appendix E. 
273. Id. § !(b). . 
274. /d. § l(c). 
275. /d. 
276. /d. 
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interests. 277 
The defendants would receive normal service of pro-
cess. 278 The court would be authorized to have additional par-
ties served to assure that those with interests adverse to the 
testator are adequately represented. 279 Interested parties 
would be allowed to intervene and the will beneficiaries would 
be made parties if the ante-mortem petition were opposed. 280 
After proper notice, the court would conduct a hearing 
examining the testator, the attesting witnesses, and other wit-
nesses or relevant evidence. 281 The court would be authorized 
to make any independent inquiry it deems appropriate282 in-
cluding calling "independent witnesses, physicians, psycholo-
gists, psychiatrists, and other persons of its own choosing to 
examine the testator or to testify in the proceedings. "283 If the 
court sustained the testator;s allegations, the will would be de-
clared valid and subject only to subsequent revocation. 284 The 
original will would remain with the court. 285 
Once the will is accepted by the court, the judgment is 
binding on the defendants and the persons whose interests 
they represented. However, the court's judgment would not 
bind the testator's spouse or descendants who would be free to 
contest the will after the testator's death.286 If, on the other 
hand, the court found for the defendants, the judgment would 
be a conclusive determination of the will's invalidity.287 
If the successful testator later decided to revoke this will, 
he would be permitted to withdraw the will provided that he 
signed a statement of revocation on the face of the will at the 
277. Id. 
278. See id. § l(d) (referring to appropriate provision of UNIFORM PROBATE 
CODE). 
279. ld. 
280. Id. 
281. Id. § 2(a). "Any· person who is a competent witness may testify concerning 
any issue despite possible disqualification after the death of the testator and shall not be · 
precluded by reason of interest." Id. § 2(b). 
282. Jd. 
283. See id. § 2(c) (erroneously listed as sub-section (3) in original). 
284. Id. § 3(a). 
285. Jd. 
286. ld. § 3(b). 
287. Id. 
HeinOnline -- 43 Ark. L. Rev. 178 1990
178 ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:131 
time of its withdrawal from the court. 288 In addition, the tes-
tator could revoke or modify the will by a subsequent written 
will or codicil even though the court is not required to be noti-
fied of the testator's actions. 289 
2. Draft B-An Administrative Approach 
A fundamentally different approach is taken by Draft B 
which adopts an exparte administrative approach.290 Draft B 
appears to be designed either as a comprehensive free-standing 
act which could be adopted by any state or as a complement 
to the Uniform Probate Code.291 
Draft B provides that a testator may "apply to a court in 
the county of his domicile for a determination that his will has 
been duly executed and is his valid will subject only to subse-
quent revocation."292 Under this draft, ante-mortem probate 
would have no affect on the ambulatory nature of the will, 
because the testator would be free to revoke the will in any 
ma.nner permitted under state law.293 
Draft B details the contents of the application and pro-
vides that the original will must be filed along with the appli-
cation. 294 However, to protect the testator's privacy the will 
does not have to be available for public inspection. 295 
Once the application is filed, the court would appoint a 
special master to assist the court in making determinations re-
garding due execution of the will. 296 The master would be re-
quired to interview the testator as well as mt:;mbers of the 
288. /d. § 4. 
289. /d. 
290. Memorandum from Gregory S. Alexander to Drafting Committee, UNIFORM 
ANTE-MORTEM PROBATE OF WILLS ACT 1 (Oct. 15, 1980). 
291. UNIF. ANTE-MORTEM PROB. OF WILLS ACT (N.C.C.U.S.L., Proposed Draft 
B, 1980). The complete text of this draft act excluding comments is reproduced in 
Appendix F. 
292. /d. § l(a). 
293. /d. at comment. 
294. /d. § l(b) (the application must allege various formalities, testamentary intent, 
execution by free will, and familiarity with will's contents). 
295. See id. (only the court or those whom the court determines to be necessary and 
proper may view the original or any copy of the testator's will). 
296. /d. § 2(a). The master must be a qualified attorney with no interest in the 
verification of the will. Id. The master's purpose is to assist the court; he "is not a 
fiduciary representing the interests of undisclosed, would-be contestants." /d. at 
comment. 
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testator's family, other relatives, friends, and anyone whom 
the court deemed appropriate. 297 In addition, the court has 
the discretion to delegate to the master various investigative 
powers such as the right to the production of relevant docu-
ments. 298 The drafters anticipated that a court would examine 
the gifts made in the will and determine the scope of the 
master's duties, powers, and responsibilities so that all rele-
vant facts would be ascertained. 299 After the master com-
pleted his investigation, he would submit a detailed written 
report for the court's in camera inspection. 300 
If the court deemed it appropriate, a hearing would then 
be conducted. 301 The court could interview the testator and 
other relevant witnesses as well as view physical evidence. 302 
In addition, the court would be authorized to call as witnesses 
"physicians, psychologists, psychiatrists, and other persons of 
its own choosing to examine the testator or to be interviewed 
by the Court."303 The testator would be represented by his 
attorney or if he had none, by court-appointed counsel. 304 
This hearing would be closed. 305 Because the procedure 
would be ex parte in nature, prior notice would not be given to 
anyone except the testator and witnesses .. Other individuals, 
such as family members, prospective heirs, and beneficiaries, 
would not be granted the opportunity to appear. 306 Thus, 
confidentiality would be assured and the hearing would not 
become adversarial in nature. 307 
If the court believes that all the formalities for a valid will 
are satisfied-that the testator has testamentary intent, that he 
297. /d. § 2(b). When the master interviews the testator, it must be outside of the 
presence of the attorney who drafted the will. /d. 
298. /d. 
299. /d. at comment. Thus, if the testator disinherited his spouse and/or children 
in favor of distant relatives, friends, or charity, a more thorough investigation could be 
conducted. /d. 
300. /d. 
301. /d. § 3. Although this hearing is not required, the drafters believed that a 
hearing would be routinely held. /d. at comment. 
302. /d. § 3(a). 
303. /d. § 3(b). 
304. /d. § 3(a). 
305. /d. § 3(b). 
306. /d. at comment. 
307. /d . . 
HeinOnline -- 43 Ark. L. Rev. 180 1990
180 ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:131 
executed the will with his free will, and that he is familiar with 
its contents-the court will issue a written determination. 308 
This 'determination would state that the will was duly exe-
cuted and is valid, subject only to the testator's subsequent 
withdrawal or revocation.309 The court would then retain cus-
tody of the original copy of the will. 310 
A determination of the validity of the will would be "con-
clusive and binding on all persons."311 The only way to con-
test a will admitted to ante-mortem probate under this 
procedure would be to allege that the will had been subse-
quently revoked. 312 In addition, no further action would be 
needed upon the testator's death to probate the will. 313 
The testator would be permitted to withdraw a will from 
the court that had already determined it to be valid by filing a 
written notice of withdrawal or revocation. 314 Once the testa-
tor files this notice, the will would be of no effect.315 Addition-
ally, the testator could revoke or modify the will with a 
subsequent will or codicil even if no notice is given to the 
court.316 
Draft B provides that the special master and all other 
persons employed by either the court or the special master are 
entitled to reasonable compensation and that the. testator is 
responsible for these expenses. 317 
3. Abandonment of Ante-Mortem Project 
The Drafting Committee for the Uniform Ante-Mortem 
Probate of Wills Act met on the seventh and eighth of No-
vember, 1980 to discuss these two drafts. 318 The Committee 
did not adopt either draft, rather, they decided to develop a 
new draft which would incorporate various policy decisions 
308. !d. § 4. 
309. !d. 
310. !d. 
311. /d. § 5. 
312. !d. 
313. See'id. (however, post-mortem proceedings would be necessary to determine 
whether the will was subsequently revoked or modified). 
314. /d. § 6. 
315. !d. 
316. !d. 
317. !d. §7. 
318. Memorandum to JEB-UPC from R.V. Wellman 8 (Nov. 17, 1980). 
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made at the meeting. 319 For example, the new statute would 
not contain a description of a special master; instead, each 
court would use its inherent power to determine whether ex-
traordinary investigations were needed. 320 Additionally, the 
court would retain a copy of the validated will but would re-
turn the original will to the testator. The ante-mortem pro-
bate file would be sealed and only be opened upon petition of 
the testator or someone exhibiting the testator's death certifi-
cate. 321 Perhaps the area of greatest debate was the binding 
effect of the decree. The new draft was to contain three op-
tions: (1) binding on everyone except to show .fraud on the 
court or revocation; (2) binding except against testator's 
spouse and children; or (3) binding unless rebutted by evi-
dence showing that the court was unaware of relevant facts 
when it validated the will. 322 
Shortly thereafter, the Joint Editorial Board-Uniform 
Probate Code voted on whether to continue the ante-mortem 
project. The vote was evenly split.323 Upon learning of the 
Board's lack of support, the Drafting Committee voted to can-
cel the project324 thus eliminating the hopes of a quick re-
sponse to the need for uniform ante-mortem legislation. 
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE FUTURE OF 
ANTE-MORTEM PROBATE 
The intense interest in ante-mortem probate generated by 
the burst of commentaries in the late 1970s and reflected in 
the actions of the legislatures of several states and the Na-
tional Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 
should not be allowed to wither despite the current lack of 
wide-spread acceptance of the technique .. Ante-mortem pro-
bate has the potential of greatly improving the ability of our 
legal system to effectively transmit an individual's wealth by 
providing the testator with greater certainty that his distribu-
tion desires will be fulfilled. Because the validity of the will 
319. /d. at 9. 
320. /d. 
321. /d. 
322. /d. at 10. 
323. Letter from Richard V. Wellman to James R. Wade (Oct. 12, 1981). 
324. /d. 
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would be determined prior to death when all relevant evidence 
is before the court, will contests would be greatly reduced. In 
addition, ante-mortem probate would lead to more efficient 
use of scarce and valuable ·resources because less court time 
would be spent dealing with spurious will contests and fewer 
estate funds would be dissipated defending those contests. 
Like any legal tool, ante-mortem probate is not without 
its difficulties. However, problems encountered with the tech-
nique are surmountable or are able to be counterbalanced. 
Several different models of ante-mortem probate exist which 
range from a pure adversarial format, the contest model; to an 
ex parte format, the administrative model. Each model has its 
positive and negative aspects. There is much debate over 
which model is preferable. This debate has caused some com-
mentators to conclude that ante-mortem probate is not feasi-
ble325 and has resulted in the National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws abandoning its ante-
mortem project. 326 
The authors hope that this article will spur a rekindling 
of interest in ante-mortem probate. No attempt is being made 
to recommend the particular details of the best ante-mortem 
scheme because the decision to proceed with ante-mortem 
probate legislation must first be made. Once a commitment is 
made to develop a workable ante-mortem scheme, attention 
can be focused on the details of the technique. The benefits of 
ante-mortem probate should not be withheld from the public 
merely because the technique is flawed or because it is difficult 
to ascertain which model will function best. 
At this time, there is insufficient experience with the vari-
ous options to conclude which one is best. What is needed is 
serious consideration of ante-mortem probate. State legisla-
tures should examine the area carefully and the National Con-
ference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws should 
reactivate their ante-mortem drafting committee. Bar associa-
tions and attorneys in states which have already enacted ante-
mortem legislation should publicize the technique and its ad-
vantages so that more testators avail themselves of the proce-
325. See Fellows, supra note 18, at 1114 (the purpose of the article is to "discourage 
the adoption of living probate schemes"). 
326. See supra notes 318-324. 
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dure. As more testators use the technique and as more 
statutes are enacted, evidence, rather than speculation, will be 
available to evaluate the ante-mortem probate models and 
lead to an informed decision as to the most effective model. It 
may even be possible that several models could co-exist in the 
same. state giving the testator the option as to method and 
effect. 
The testator's desire to insure that the distribution of his 
estate is not frustrated by a will contest differs with each indi-
vidual. Some testators may have no interest in any type of 
ante-mortem procedure because his will treats potential heirs 
in a manner similar to the state's intestate distribution stat-
utes. Others might be satisfied with a simple procedural 
change that eases the proponent's burden of proof of a valid 
will. A third group of testators, realizing that their will stands 
a high probability of being contested, may wish, and be willing 
to pay for, an absolutely fool-proofmeans.ofprecluding a con-
test. The third situation provides the most obvious scenario 
for using ante-mortem probate. 
The present general status of probate law requires an ap-
plicant who seeks to probate a will to prove all statutory re-
quirements that concern the competency and capacity of the 
testator327 as well as the requisite formalities of the will. 328 
For most testators, this may not be an undesirable require-
327. See, e.g., Estate of Sanderson v. Martin, 341 P.2d 358, 363 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1959) (presumption exists that a person is sane at the execution of a will with the bur-
den on the contestant to show incapacity); In re Young, 60 Ohio App. 2d 390, -, 397 
N.E.2d. 1223, 1225-26 (1978) (will must be admitted when the proponents introduce 
substantial evidence tending to prove the validity of the will); Nowlin v. Trottman, 348 
S.W.2d 169, 172 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961) (the proponent has burden of proof in making 
out a prima facia case of testamentary capacity); see also CAL. PROB. CODE § 8252 
(Deering Supp. 1989) (proponents have burden of proof of due execution when will 
contested); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2107.18 (Baldwin 1988) (a court shall admit to 
probate a will if it appears from the face of the will or demanded by attesting witnesses 
that its execution complies with the law valid at that time). 
328. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 6110 (Deering Supp. 1989) (a valid executed will re-
quires a writing signed by testator or by his direction in the presence of two attesting 
witnesses who understand that instrument they sign is testator's will); OHIO REv. CoDE 
ANN. § 2107.03 (Baldwin 1988) (a valid executed will requires a writing signed at the 
end of the document by a party making it or by his designated person in testator's 
presence and be attested and subscribed in his presence by two or more competent wit-
nesses who saw testator subscribe or heard him acknowledge his signature); TEX. PROB. 
CODE ANN.§ 59 (Vernon 1980) (every last will shall be in writing signed by testator or 
person designated by him in his presence attested to, if not wholly in testator's hand-
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ment. However, cases illustrate that in many instances this 
burden can be a pit-fall. 329 A change in this burden of proof 
may result in a procedure which is more fair in many in-
stances. For example, if the will is self-proved by statutory 
affidavit as is allowed in many states, 330 or if the will execution 
ceremony is videotaped, 331 then a statutory presumption that 
the will is valid and proper for probate could be created. A 
contest would continue to be permitted, but the burden of 
proof would shift to the contestant to prove the invalidity of 
the will. 
Finally, if the testator desires and is willing to absorb the 
cost of the procedure, an ante-mortem technique should be 
available to assure the effectiveness of a testator's resolution 
that a will contest will not occur. Although it may be prema-
ture to make a knowledgeable recommendation as to whether 
an adversarial, guardianship, or administrative model of ante-
mortem probate should be adopted, law makers should un-
dauntingly pursue this viable alternative to post-mortem 
probate. 
writing, by two or more credible witnesses over fourteen years of age who shall sub-
scribe their names thereto in their own handwriting in the presence of testator). 
329. See, e.g., Estate of Morgan v. Peterson, 225 Cal. App. 2d 156, -, 37 Cal. Rptr. 
160, 168-69 (1964) (testamentary incompetency on a given day can be proven by incom-
petency at times prior to and after that date particularly when characteristics of testa-
tor's malady indicate permanent and progressing mental disease); Estate of Bliss v. 
Williams, 199 Cal. App. 2d 630, -, 18 Cal. Rptr. 821, 827 (1962) (finding that testator 
was of unsound mind when the ·will was executed was sustained by evidence that the 
testator was not aware of his properties and mentally incapable of transacting any busi-
ness); Borgman v. Dillow, 61 Ohio L. Abs. 429, -, 105 N.E.2d 69, 70 (Ohio Ct. App. 
1951) (will not admitted to probate where proponent failed to prove that witness saw 
testatrix's signature and where testatrix failed to tell witness that she had signed it); In 
reStock's Will, 174 Okla. 78, -, 49 P.2d 503, 505 (1935) (proponents failed to prove 
due execution and attestation of a will by a preponderance of evidence); Hogan v. Stoe-
pler, 82 S.W.2d 1000, 1002 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935) (will failed where alleged testator did 
not execute the will according to statutory prerequisites and alleged subscribing wit-
nesses did not witness it). 
330. See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 474.337 (Vernon Supp. 1989) (self-proving will 
provision); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 84, §55 (West Supp. 1989) (self-proving will clause); 
20 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 3132.1 (Purdon Supp. 1988) (provision for self-proving 
will); TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 59 (Vernon 1980) (self-proving will provision). 
331. See supra § II(B)(4) and accompanying notes. · 
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APPENDIX A 
Michigan Act 
1883 Mich. Pub. St. 17 
185 
Sect. 1. The people of the state of Michigan enact, that 
to any will heretofore or hereafter executed, the testator may 
make and annex· his petition to be sworn to before and 
presented to the judge of probate for the county where the 
testator resides, asking that such will be admitted and estab-
lished as his last will and testament. 
Sect. 2. Every such petition shall contain averments 
that such will was duly executed by the petitioner without 
fear, fraud, impartiality, or undue influence, and with a full 
knowledge of its contents,· and that the testator is of sound 
mind and memory and full testamentary capacity and shall 
state the names and addresses of every person who at the time 
of making and filing the same would be interested in the estate 
of the maker of such will as heir if such maker should at the 
making of such petition become deceased, and may also con-
tain the names and addresses of any other persons whom such 
testator may desire to make parties to such proceedings. 
Sect. 3. · Such judge of probate shall thereupon, upon re-
quest of such testator, appoint a time for the hearing of such 
petition and issue citations to the parties named in such peti-
tion, and direct published notice of such hearing, and have 
such hearing, after proof of service of citations and of publica-
tion of notice, in the manner, as near as practicable, as is re-
quired for the probate of wills. 
Sect. 4. If any person named in such petition shall be a 
minor, or otherwise under disability, a guardian ad litem shall 
be appointed by such judge to represent such person. On such 
hearing such judge of probate shall examine into the matters 
alleged in such petition, and into the testamentary capacity of 
such testator, and examine witnesses in relation thereto, and if 
it shall appear that the allegations of such petition are true, 
and that said testator was of sound mind and memory and full 
testamentary capacity, such judge shall make a decree 
thereon, and shall cause a copy of such decree to be attached 
to said will, certified under the seal of said court, decreeing 
that the testator, at the making of such will and such petition, 
HeinOnline -- 43 Ark. L. Rev. 186 1990
186 ARkANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:131 
was possessed of sound mind and memory, and full testamen-
tary capacity, and that said will was executed without fear, 
fraud, impartiality or undue influence, which decree shall 
have the same effect as if made by said court after the death of 
the testator on the probate of such will, and such will having 
been so established shall not be set aside or impeached on the 
grounds of insanity or want of testamentary capacity on the 
part of the testator, or that the same was executed through 
fear, fraud, impartiality, or undue influence. 
Sect. 5. Appeals shall be in the same manner as from 
probate of wills. 
Sect. 6. Nothing in this act contained shall be construed 
to prevent the revocation of such will, or alteration or other 
change thereof, as in ordinary wills. 
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North Dakota 
N.D. Cent. Code (Supp. 1987) 
Chapter 30.1-08.1 
Ante-Mortem Probate of Wills 
187 
30.1-08.1-01. Declaratory judgment. Any person who 
executes a will disposing of his estate in accordance with this 
title may institute a proceeding under chapter 32-23 for a 
judgment declaring the validity of the will as to the signature 
on the will, the required number of witnesses to the signature 
and their signatures, and the testamentary capacity and free-
dom from undue influence of the person executing the will. 
30.1-08.1-02. Parties-Process. Any beneficiary named 
in the will and all the testator's present intestate successors 
shall be named parties to the proceeding. For the purposes of 
this chapter, any beneficiary named in the will and all the tes-
tator's present intestate successors shall be deemed possessed 
of inchoate property rights. 
Service of process upon the parties to the proceeding 
shall be made in accordance with rule 4 of the North Dakota 
Rules of Civil Procedure. 
30.1-08.1-03. Finding of validity-Revocation. If the 
court finds under chapter 32-23 that the will has been prop-
erly executed and that the plaintiff testator has the requisite 
testamentary capacity and freedom from undue influence, it 
shall declare the will valid and order it placed on file with the 
court. For the purposes of section 30.1-12-02, a finding of va-
lidity under this chapter shall constitute an adjudication of 
probate. The will shall be binding in North Dakota unless 
and until the plaintiff-testator executes a new will and insti-
tutes a new proceeding under this chapter naming the appro-
priate parties to the new proceeding as well as the parties to 
any former proceeding brought under this chapter. 
30.1-08.1-04. Admissibility of facts-Effect on other ac-
tions. The facts found in a proceeding brought under this 
chapter shall not be admissible in evidence in any proceeding 
other than one brought in North Dakota to determine the va-
lidity of a will; nor shall the determination in a proceeding 
under this chapter be binding, upon the parties to such pro-
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ceeding, in any action not brought to determine the validity of 
a will. 
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Ohio Rev. Code Ann. (Anderson Supp. 1987) 
Declaration of Validity of Will 
189 
[§ 2107.08.1] § 2107.081 Petition for judgment declar-
ing validity of will. 
(A) A person who executes a will allegedly in conform-
ity with the laws of this state may petition the probate court of 
the county in which he is domiciled, if he is domiciled in this 
state or the probate court of the county in which any of his 
real property is located, if he is not domiciled in this state, for 
a judgment declaring the validity of the will. 
The petition may be filed in the form determined by the 
probate court of the county in which it is filed. 
The petition shall name as parties defendant all persons 
named in the will as beneficiaries, and all of the persons who 
would be entitled to inherit from the testator under Chapter 
2105. of the Revised Code had the testator died intestate on 
the date the petition was filed. 
For the purposes of this section, "domicile" shall be de-
termined at the time of filing the petition with the probate 
court. 
(B) The failure of a testator to file a petition for a judg-
ment declaring the validity of a will he has executed shall not 
be construed as evidence or an admission that the will was not 
properly executed pursuant to section 2107.03 of the Revised 
Code or any prior law of this state in effect at the time of 
execution or as evidence or an admission that the testator did 
not have the requisite testamentary capacity anq freedom 
from· undue influence under section 2107.02 of the Revised 
Code. 
[§ 2107 .082] § 2107.082 Service of process. 
Service of process in an action authorized by section 
2107.081 [2107.08.1] of the Revised Code shall be made on 
every party defendant named in that action by the following 
methods: 
(A) By certified mail, or any other valid personal ser-
vice permitted by the Rules of Civil Procedure, if the party is 
an inhabitant of this state or is found within this state; 
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(B) By certified mail, with a copy of the summons and 
petition, to the party at his last known address or any other 
valid personal service permitted by the Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, if the party is not an inhabitant of this state or is not 
found within this state; 
(C) By publication, according to Civil Rule 4.4, in a 
newspaper of general circulation published in the county 
where the petition was filed, for three consecutive weeks, if the 
address of the party is unknown, if all methods of personal 
service permitted under division (B) of this section were at-
tempted without success, or if the interest of the party under 
the will or in the estate of the testator should the will be de-
clared invalid is unascertainable at that time. 
[§ 2107.08.3] § 2107.083 Hearing on validity of will. 
When a petition is filed pursuant to section 2107.081 
[2107.08.1] of the Revised Code, the probate court shall con-
duct a hearing on the validity of the will. The hearing shall be 
adversary in nature and shall be conducted pursuant to sec-
tion 2721.10 of the Revised Code, except as otherwise pro-
vided in sections 2107.081 [2107.08.1] to 2107.085 [2107.08.5] 
of the Revised Code. 
[§ 2107.08.4] § 2107.084 Declaration of validity; seal-
ing, filing; procedure for revoking or modifying will. 
(A) The probate court shall declare the will valid if, af-
ter conducting a proper hearing pursuant to section 2107.083 
[2107.08.3] of the Revised Code, it finds that the will was 
properly executed pursuant to section 2107.03 of the Revised 
Code or under any prior law of this state that was in effect at 
the time of execution and that the testator had the requisite 
testamentary capacity and freedom from undue influence pur-
suant to section 2107.03 of the Revised Code. 
Any such judgment ·declaring a will valid is binding in 
this state as to the validity of the will on all facts found, unless 
provided otherwise in this section, section 2107.33, or division 
(B) of section 2107.71 of the Revised Code, and, if the will 
remains valid, shall give the will full legal effect as the instru-
ment of disposition of the testator's estate, unless the will has 
been modified or revoked according to law. 
(B) Any declaration of validity issued as a judgment 
pursuant to this section shall be sealed in an envelope along 
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with the will to which it pertains, and filed by the probate 
judge or his designated officer in the offices of that probate 
court. The filed will shall be available during the testator's 
lifetime only to the testator. If the testator removes a filed will 
from the possession of the probate judge, the declaration of 
validity rendered under division (A) of this section no longer 
has any effect. 
(C) A testator may revoke or modify a will declared 
valid and filed with a probate court pursuant to this section by 
petitioning the probate court in possession of the will and ask-
ing that the will be revoked or modified. The petition shall 
include a document executed pursuant to sections 2107.02 and 
2107.03 of the Revised Code, and shall name as parties de-
fendant those persons who were parties defendant in any pre-
vious action declaring the will valid, those persons who are 
named in any modification as beneficiaries, and those persons 
who would be entitled because of the revocation or modifica-
tion, to inherit from the testator under Chapter 2105. of the 
Revised Code had the testator died intestate on the date the 
petition was filed. Service of the petition and process shall be 
made on these parties by the methods authorized in section 
2107.082 [2107.08.2] of the Revised Code. 
Unless waived by all parties, the court shall conduct a 
hearing on the validity of the revocation or modification re-
quested under this division in the same manner as it would on 
any initial petition for a judgment declaring a will to be valid 
under this section. If the court finds that the revocation or 
modification is valid, as defined in division (A) of this section, 
the revocation or modification shall take full effect and be 
binding, and revoke the will or modify it to the extent of the 
valid modification. The revocation or modification, the judg-
ment declaring it valid, and the will itself shall be sealed in an 
envelope and filed with the probate court, and shall be avail-
able during the testator's lifetime only to the testator. 
/ (D) A testator may also modify a will by any later will 
or codicil executed according to the laws of this state or any 
other state and may revoke a will by any method permitted 
under section 2107.33 of the Revised Code. · 
(E) A declaration of validity of a will, or of a revocation 
or modification of a will previously determined to be valid, 
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given under division (C) of this section, is' not subject to collat-
eral attack, except by a person and in the manner specified in 
division (B) of section 2107.71 of the Revised Code, but is ap-
pealable subject to the terms of Chapter 2721. of the Revised 
Code. 
[§ 2107.08.5] § 2107.085 Effect on other proceedings. 
The finding of facts by a probate court in a proceeding 
brought under sections 2107.081 [2107.08.1] to 2107.085 
[2107.08.5] of the Revised Code is not admissible as evidence 
in any proceeding ot~er than one brought to determine the 
validity of a will. 
The determination or judgment rendered in a proceeding 
under these sections is not binding upon the parties to such a 
proceeding in any action not brought to determine the validity 
of a will. 
The failure of a testator to file a petition for a judgment 
declaring the validity of a will he has executed is not admissi-
ble as evidence in any proceeding to determine the validity of 
that will or any other will executed by the testator. 
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Ark. Code Ann. (1987) 
Ante-Mortem Probate Act 
28-40-201. Title. 
193 
This subchapter shall be known and may be cited as the 
"Arkansas Ante-Mortem Probate Act of 1979." 
28-40-202. Action for declaratory judgment. 
(a) Any person who executes a will disposing of all or 
part of an estate located in Arkansas may institute an action 
in the probate court of the appropriate county of this state for 
a declaratory judgment establishing the validity of the will. 
(b) All beneficiaries named in the will and all the testa-
tor's existing intestate successors shall be named parties to the 
action. 
(c) For the purpose of this subchapter, the beneficiaries 
and intestate successors shall be deemed possessed of inchoate 
property rights. 
(d) Service of process shall be as in other declaratory 
judgment actions. 
28-40-203. Court findings-Effect. 
(a) If the court finds that the will was properly exe-
cuted, that the testator had the requisite testamentary capac-
ity and freedom from undue influence at the time of execution, 
and that the will is otherwise valid, it shall declare the will 
valid and order it placed on file with the court. 
(b) A finding of validity pursuant to this subchapter 
shall constitute an adjudication of probate. However, such 
validated wills may be modified or superseded by subsequently 
executed valid wills, codicils, and other testamentary instru-
ments, whether or not validated pursuant to this subchapter. 
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APPENDIX E 
Uniform Ante-Mortem Probate of Wills Act 
Draft A 
November 7-9, 1980 
SECTION 1. (Verification of Will; Declaration of Due 
Execution of a Will in Testator's Lifetime.) 
(a) Venue. A testator may during his lifetime petition 
a court in the county of his domicile for an order binding all 
interested persons other than his spouse and descendants [de-
claring] that his will has been duly executed and is his valid 
will subject only to subsequent revocation. 
(b) Petition. The petition shall contain (1) a copy of 
the will which the plaintiff wishes to verify, (2) an allegation 
that the will is in writing and was signed by the petitioner or 
in the petitioner's name by some other person in the peti-
tioner's presence and by his direction and was signed by two 
witnesses in the presence of the testator, (3) an allegation that 
the instrument was properly executed with testamentary in-
tent, (4) an allegation that the petitioner had testamentary ca-
pacity, (5) an allegation that the petitioner executed the 
instrument in the exercise of his own free will, and (6) an alle-
gation that the petitioner is familiar with the contents of the 
instrument. The original will shall be filed with the petition. 
(c) Defendants. The defendants to the proceedings 
shall be a representative group named from among the heirs 
presumptive of the plaintiff and others who, as devisees under 
earlier wills of the petitioner or for other reasons, appear to 
have some prospect of being selected as devisees [testamentary 
beneficiaries] of the petitioner. If the heirs presumptive are the 
petitioner's spouse, or descendants, or both, the defendants shall 
be named from among those who would be the heirs presump-
tive if the petitioner were unmarried and without living descen-
dant. If [these] the potential defendants are not numerous, all 
whose interests are adverse shall be named as defendants. If 
they are so numerous that joinder of all is impracticable, sev-
eral may be sued as representative parties on behalf of all. 
Before the court allows the action to proceed, if all of the heirs 
presumptive and devisees under earlier wills are not joined, it 
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shall find that the defendants will adequately protect the inter-
est of all others adverse to the plaintiff. 
(d) Service. The defendants shall be served as pro-
vided in 1- -. The court may order additional persons made 
defendants and served to assure the adequate representation of 
the interest of those adverse to the plaintiff. Interested per-
sons, including persons named as beneficiaries of the will in 
suit, shall be freely allowed to intervene, and beneficiaries of 
the will in suit shall be made parties if the petition is opposed. 
SECTION 2. (Hearing; Witnesses.) 
(a) Hearing; Inquiry by Court. After notice, the court 
shall hear the testator, the attesting witnesses if available and 
other witnesses or relevant evidence as the testator or parties 
defendant may present. The court may make any independent 
inquiry it deems appropriate .. 
(b) Witnesses; Competence. Any person who is a 
competent witness may testify concerning any issue despite 
possible disqualification after the death of the testator and 
shall not be precluded by reason of interest. 
(3)[sic] Court Witnesses. The court may call as in-
dependent witnesses, physicians, psychologists, psychiatrists, 
and other persons of its own choosing to examine the testator 
or to testify in the proceedings. 
SECTION 3. (Order; Judgment.) 
(a) If the court is satisfied that the allegations of the pe-
tition have been sustained, it shall by order declare that the 
testator's will has been duly executed and is his valid will sub-
ject only to subsequent revocation and shall order the will re-
tained in custody of the court. 
(b) The judgment, if for the plaintiff, shall bind the de-
fendants and all persons whose interests they represent but it 
shall not be binding on the petitioner's spouse and descendants 
who survive him and are otherwise not disqualified by early 
death, renunciation or contract to succeed to his estate. The 
judgment, if for the defendants, shall be a conclusive determi-
nation that the will which was the subject of the adjudication 
was not a valid will. 
SECTION 4. (Withdrawal of Will, Revocation.) 
A will declared to be valid under this procedure may be 
withdrawn during the testator's lifetime provided the testator 
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signs a statement of revocation to be written across the face of 
the will at the time of withdrawal. A request for withdrawal of 
a will previously adjudicated to be valid shall be made by veri-
fied application filed with the court. [Upon his verified appli-
cation filed with the court and when so withdrawn shall be 
deemed revoked.] A will declared to be valid hereunder may 
also be revoked or modified by a subsequent [written] will or 
codicil though the court is not informed thereof 
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Uniform Ante-Mortem Probate of Wills Act 
Draft B 
November 7-9, 1980 
197 
SECTION 1. (Application for Ante-Mortem Verifica-
tion of Will; Declarations Regarding Due Execution of Will 
During Testator's Lifetime.) 
(a) Venue. During his lifetime a testator may apply to a 
court in the county of his domicile for a determination that his 
will has been duly executed and is his valid will subject only to 
subsequent revocation. 
(b) Contents of Application. The application shall con-
tain a copy of the will that the applicant wishes to have veri-
fied and shall include the following allegations: (1) that the 
will is in writing and was signed by the applicant or in the 
applicant's name by some other person in the applicant's pres-
ence and by his direction and was signed in the presence of the 
testator by two persons each of whom witnessed either the 
signing or the testator's acknowledgement of the signature or 
of the will; (2) that the instrument was properly executed with 
testamentary intent; (3) that the applicant executed the instru-
ment in the exercise of his own free will; and (5) [sic] that the 
applicant is familiar with the contents of the instrument. 
The original will shall be filed with the application, but 
neither the original nor any copy thereof shall be available for 
inspection by any person other than the Court except as the 
Court in its discretion shall determine to be necessary and 
proper. 
SECTION 2. (Procedure; Appointment of Special 
Master.) 
(a) Qualifications. Upon the filing of an application, the 
Court shall appoint a special master to assist the Court in 
making determinations regarding due execution of the will. 
The master shall be a qualified attorney having no interest in 
verification of the will. 
(b) Powers and Duties. The master shall interview the 
testator outside the presence of the attorney who prepared the 
will. He shall also interview members of the testator's family, 
other relatives and friends of the testator, or any other indi-
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vidual as the Court shall direct him. The Court may delegate 
to the master such powers of investigation, including the right 
to have any relevant documents produced, as it shall deem 
appropriate under the circumstances. Following completion 
of his investigation, the master shall submit to the Court a 
written report detailing his findings. This report shall not be 
available for inspection to anyone other than the Court. 
SECTION 3. (Procedure; Hearing.) 
(a) Hearing; Inquiry by Court. The Court may, if it 
deems appropriate, schedule a hearing at which to interview 
the testator, the attesting witnesses if available, and any other 
witnesses or relevant evidence. The testator shall at all times 
be represented by counsel of his own choice or by court-ap-
pointed counsel. 
(b) Witnesses; Medical Examination. The Court may 
call as witnesses physicians, psychologists, psychiatrists, and 
other persons of its own choosing to examine the testator or to 
be interviewed by the Court. All interviews shall be con-
ducted at a closed hearing. 
SECTION 4. (Determination on Application.) 
If the Court is satisfied that the allegations of the applica-
tion have been sustained, it shall issue a written determination 
that the testator's will has been duly executed and is his valid 
will subject only to subsequent withdrawal of the will or revo-
cation and shall require the will retained in the custody of the 
Court. 
SECTION 5. (Effect of Determination; Necessity of 
Post-Mortem Proceedings to Probate.) 
(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, 
the determination of validity of a will during the testator's life-
time under this procedure shall be conclusive and binding on 
all persons. Any will which has been the subject of a determi-
nation of validity under this procedure shall not be subject to 
subsequent contest by any person except on the ground of sub-
sequent revocation. 
(b) Unless subsequently withdrawn or revoked by the 
testator, any will which has been the subject of a determina-
tion of validity under this procedure shall be deemed to have 
been probated and no proceedings to probate such a will shall 
be necessary after the death of the testator, except for pur-
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poses of determining whether such a will has been subse-
quently revoked or modified. 
SECTION 6. (Withdrawal of Will; Revocation.) 
A will determined to be valid under the procedure may 
be withdrawn during the testator's lifetime provided the testa-
tor files with the Court written notice of his withdrawal or 
revocation. Upon filing such notice with the Court, the will 
previously determined to be valid shall no longer be deemed 
his valid will. A will previously determined to be valid here-
under may also be revoked or modified by a subsequent will or 
· codicil though the Court is not informed thereof. 
SECTION 7. (Compensation and Expenses.) 
The special master and any physician, psychologist, psy-
chiatrist, or other person employed by the Court or the special 
master hereunder are entitled to reasonable compensation. 
The testator shall be responsible for expenses associated with 
these proceedings. 
